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Abstract 
This paper characterizes neutral social functions that 
are fully implementable. A necessary condition for full 
implementation under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the 
strong Nash equilibrium concept is that the neutral social 
function being implemented be monotonic and simple. If a 
neutral monotonic social function is simple and the set of 
winning coalitions is nondictatorial then the social function is 
fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite 
alternative sets a neutral monotonic social function will be 
fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and 
only if it is simple and dictatorial. 
FULL NASH IMPLE�ffiNTATION OF NEUTRAL SOCIAL FUNCTIONS 
James  F .  Strnad II• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two problem s  have been prominent in social choi ce theory in 
recent years .  One i s  the probl em of determining the restrict i ons that 
will  re sul t if soc ial choice proce sse s are required to have ce rtain 
qual i t i e s  when individual preference s are known. The qual i t i e s  that 
have been  stud i ed are po ssible  ethical or l og i cal de s iderata such as 
neutral i ty ,  monotonic i ty ,  trans i t iv i ty and acyc l i ci ty .  The 
restrict ions usual ly involve the del ineat ion of whi ch coal i t i ons  or 
individuai0 in a soc i e ty can be perm i tted  to determ ine social choi ce s .  
A se cond problem, the problem o f  " impl ementat ion, " ari se s  from 
the obse rvat ion that individual pre ference s generally are not known 
and that individual s may have an incent ive not to reveal the ir  true 
preference s given the social choice consequence s .  Unl e s s  thi s se cond 
problem is solved,  solut ion to the f irst  prob l em of " characteriz ing 
soc ial choi ce processe s" may not be of any practi cal impor t .  It doe s  
l i tt le  good t o  know that a parti cular soc ial choi ce  proce ss  has 
certain ethical or l ogi cal qual i t i e s  if everyone r eveal s the i r  true 
preferen ce s when, in fact ,  there i s  a s i gn i f i cant incent ive for 
individuals  to try to change the out come by ly ing . 
Recent work such as Roberts  ( 1979) and Sen ( 1983) has 
attempted  to treat the impl ementation problem in the same manner as 
the treatment of the first  probl em. I . e . , th i s  work has attempted to 
characterize  social choi ce proce s s e s  for which the impl ementation 
probl em can be solved .  Thi s  art icle  cont inue s that characterization 
ta sk, 
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As can be seen from the recent surveys in  Dasgupta , Hammond 
and Maskin ( 197 9) and Moul in ( 1981 ) ,  re sul ts on the impl ementat ion 
prob l em general ly have been ne gat ive,  de scribing broad c lasses  of 
social choice rul e s  that cannot be  impl ement e d .  A striking exception 
i s  Ma skin ( 1977 ) .  In that paper ,  Maskin showed that for f ini te 
al ternative sets soc ial choice  corre spondence s sati sfying two 
condi t ion s ,  "Maskin monotoni c i ty" and "NVP, " can be  ful ly impl emented 
by Nash equil ibria, ( The Maskin monoton i c i ty cond i t ion i s  a nece ssary 
cond i t i on whi l e  NVP i s  not , )  In Maskin ( 197 9) , it i s  demonst rated 
that thi s  resul t is sensi tive to the equil ibri um concept empl oyed.  In 
par t i cular, for f inite  al ternative se t s ,  soc ial choi ce corre spondence s 
that are fully impl ementable  by s trong Nash equi l ibria must be Maskin 
monoton i c  but mus t not sati sfy NVP. 
Maskin monoton i c i ty require s that an al ternat ive x in the 
choi ce s e t  of a social choi ce corre spondence w i l l  remain in the choice 
set  i f  individual preference s change in such a way that no per son who 
found x at l east  as good as some other al ternat ive y prior  to the 
change f inds y better than x after the change . Thi s  cond i t i on,  which 
i s  a ne c e s sary condit ion for ful l impl ementat ion by both Nash and 
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s trong Nash equil ibria, speaks to the compo si tion of the choi ce s et  
when preference s change , It has no obvious conne ct ion to re stri ctions 
on which coal ition s  can dictate social choi ce ,  the traditional
re strictions exam ine d in characteriz ing soc ial choice proce s s e s .  One 
of the main tasks in this art i c l e  i s  to demonstrate such a conne ct ion .  
The condit ion NVP require s that i f  al l bu t  one per son in 
society finds an al ternative y to be at l east  as good as any other , y 
must  be in the choi ce se t for the social choice corre spondence , Thi s  
condi t ion i s  more "conl i t ional"  in content than Maskin monot on i c i ty .  
Using the re sul t s  on Maskin monoton i c i ty ,  thi s  art i c l e  trans late s NVP 
directly  into famil iar coal i t ional condit ion s .  
After def initions and notation are devel oped i n  Sect ion II ,  
Sec t i on III  extends the  Maskin ( 1977 )  resul t that under Maskin 
monotonic i ty and NVP social choice  corre spondence s are ful ly 
impl ementab l e  by Nash equil ibria to al ternative s e t s  that are "CCE 
sub se t s ," compact , convex s ub s e t s  of a Euc l idean space . Thi s  
extens i on al l ows  many o f  the characteri zation re sul t s  t o  apply whe ther 
the .Jternative set  is a CCE sub s e t  or f ini t e .  In add i tion ,  it  al lows 
compari son of the CCE sub s e t  resul t s  here w i th other CCE sub s e t  
characterization re sul t s  in the l i teratur e .  
The main re sul ts a r e  in Section IV. Thi s  section begins by
l imiting cons ideration to so c ial choice corre spondence s that are 
ne utral social funct ion s ,  i . e .  neutral with the " so cial ly preferred 
to" relation be ing  an asymmetr i c  b inary relation ,  
A key resul t i n  Sect ion IV i s  Theorem 5 :  a neutral social 
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function i s  Maskin monotonic  if and only if it i s  a simpl e neutral 
monotonic  social funct ion .  Thus ,  Maskin monoton i c i ty ,  apparently a 
condit ion concerning choice set  e l ement s ,  produce s two "coal itional "  
condit ions , monotoni c i ty and s impl i c ity.  Monotonic i ty requi res  that 
when member s are added  to a winning coal i tion ,  it s t i l l wins , and when 
members  are subtracted  from a l os ing coa l i tion ,  it s t i l l  l ose s .  
Simpl i c i ty require s that there i s  a s et  S o f  coal itions such 
that for any two al ternatives x and y, x is social ly pref erred to y if 
and only if al l the members  in a coa l i tion in S so prefer .  Thi s  
cond i tion i s  qui t e  restrictive since i t  rul e s  out a l l  soc ial choi ce 
rul e s  where the s e t  of coal itions that w in depends on who i s  
indifferent . For exampl e ,  Pareto extension rul e s  ( x  i s  soc ial ly 
preferred to y if at l east  one per son so prefers  and no one has the 
oppos i te preferenc e )  and relative maj ori ty rul e (x is socially 
preferred to  y if a maj ori ty of those who are not indi fferent so 
prefer )  are not simpl e .  
For a s impl e  neutral monoton i c  soc ial funct ion ,  NVP i s  
equival ent t o  the s e t  o f  winning coal itions not be ing an ul traf il ter.  
I . e . , NVP requires  that the soc ial fun c t ion is not di ctatorial . 
C'ombining the se re sul t s  w i th those of Ma skin ( 1977 )  and Ma skin 
( 1979) yields a cluster  of characterization theorems .  Neutral soc ial 
funct ions wi l l  be ful ly  Nash implementabl e  or ful ly strong Nash 
impl ementabl e  only if they are simpl e ne utral monoton i c  soc ial 
functions . A neutral soc ial funct ion wil l be  ful ly Nash impl ementable  
i f  i t  i s  a non-di ctator ial simpl e neutral monotonic  soc ial funct ion, 
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Ea ch of these re sul t s  holds both for f inite a l terna t ive sets  and CCE 
subse t  a l ternative se t s ,  
The f inal maj or characteri z a t ion re sul t  appl i e s  when tlte 
alternat ive set  i s  f in i te , In that c a se ne utral soc i al func t ions w i l l  
b e  ful ly strong Nash impl ementable  if  and only if  they are d ictatorial 
s impl e neutral monotonic soc ial functions . Thi s  i s  in contrast  to the 
re sul t that full Nash impl ementation of neutral social func t ions  i s  
po s s ibl e wi thout a d i c t a tor , Impo sing a stronger equil ibrium concept 
ha s a signi ficant co s t .  
The chara cteri zat ion re sul t s  in  thi s paper can  be contras ted 
to other resul ts in  the l iterature acros s  three  basic  paramete r s: 
restr i c t i ons on the c l a s s  of social  choi ce proce sse s studied ,  
re strict ions on the  equil ibrium concepts  studied ,  and restrict ions  on  
the  impl ementat ion concept s s tudied .  With respe c t  to  the  later  two 
parameters ,  th i s  art i c l e  i s  l imited to Nash and s trong Nash 
equil ibrium concepts  a nd to  ful l impl ement a tion,  The rea son is  that 
the se are the re s tr i ct ions on Maskin ' s  re sul t s ,  and the po s i tive 
na ture of some of those re sul t s  mot ivate s the e ffort to characterize  
them in a " coal i t ional " way , 
Ferej ohn, Grether and McKe lvey ( 1 982 ) deve l op some 
chara"teri zation resul t s  when implementa t ion rather than ful l 
implementa,•on i s  the impl ement a t ion concept ,  A ful l  impl ementation 
anal ogy to one of  thei r  impl ementa t ion resul t s  is  deve l oped a s  
Coroll ary 2 in Section  IV . De spite the l ingu i s t i c  impl i cation tha t  
ful l imp l ementa tion i s  somehow normatively b e t ter  ("ful l er")  than 
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impl ementa tion, no such superior i ty actua l ly exi st s ,  Both 
implementa t ion concept s  require that a l l  equil ibria  be in  the choi ce 
se t ,  Ful l implement a t ion requires  that a l l  choi ce s e t  e l ement s be 
reachabl e by some equil ibrium while  impl ementation requires  only that 
a t  l ea st one choice s et  a l terna t ive be  reachabl e  by an equil ibrium ,  
The only normat ive cr i t er i a  ari s ing from the soc ial cho i ce rul e i s  
that choi ce s e t  e l ements are d e s irab l e .  The fact that  more choice s et  
e l ement s are  reachab l e  by  one de c i s ion mechanism has  no  normative 
signif icance under the social  choi ce rule  s ince it doe s  not 
di s t ingui sh be tween choice s e t  e l ement s ,  
Fina l ly ,  thi s  art i c l e  restr i c t s  the domain o f  soc i al choice 
rul e s  to neutral soc i a l  funct ions . Neutral i ty is a nontrivial e thical  
and struc tural as sumpti on ,  I t  bars the use  of separate proce sse s for 
parti cular choi ce s .  Thus , for exampl e ,  ne utral i ty i s  v iol a te d  i f  a 
higher voting requi rement i s  required for certain " spe c i a l "  de c i s i ons 
( such as  const i tut iona l amendment s )  than for "ordinary" dec i si ons , 
The main j us t i f ication for as suming neutral ty l i e s  i n  the fact  
that tha t  a s sumpt ion al lows Ma skin ' s  po s i tive resul ts ,  highly unusual 
against the general  backdrop of  negative impl ementation re sul t s ,  to be 
characterized  " coal i t iona l ly . "  But beyond that, much of the 
l i tera ture characteriz ing impl ementa t ion re sul ts impose s  restrict ions 
that are arguably even more severe and that l ead to hi ghly ne gat ive 
re sul t s .  For exampl e ,  Roberts  ( 1979)  and Sen ( 1983 )  are two l eading 
recent paper s ,  Almost al l of Roberts  ( 197 9)  and al l of Sen ( 1 983 ) are 
l imited  to  a st udy of dec i s ive social  choi ce corre spondence s ,  i . e . , 
social choice corre spondences that are singl e-val ued ,  Roberts not e s  
that decisive so cial choice correpondence s a r e  attractive because the 
social planne r must pick� al terna tive and such social choice 
correspondence s spe cify which one is most desirabl e ,  De cisivene s s  
also e liminates  the ne e d  to choose be tween full impl ementation and 
implementation , With only one member in the choice set  those 
impl ementation concep t s  are equivalent , 
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Al though de cisiveness is a desirabl e  trait for a social 
process ,  imposing de cisiveness  severely restric t s  the class of social 
choice rul e s  under con sideration and that restriction may invol ve the 
sacrifice of other e thical or l ogical desiderata. Consider ,  for 
exampl e ,  proportional voting rul e s .  Craven ( 1971 )  shows that for the 
choice se t to be  nonempty over a finite a l ternative set with any more 
than a few al terna tives in it,  a voting proportion c l ose to unanimity 
is required,  Greenberg ( 1979) make s  a simil ar showing for CCE subse t 
al ternative se ts with more than a few dimensions .  But propor tional 
voting rul e s  requiring propor tions significantly greater than one-hal f 
often wil l not be d e cisive ,  Two a l terna tives preferred to al l others 
by everyone may " tie" as social choices because voters are ne arly 
equal ly  divided  b e tween them , For propor tional voting rul es, 
de cisiveness therefore  may be obtaine d only at the cost  of the 
'po ssibility of having an empty choice se t ,  
Another problem with impo sing de cisiveness on the underlying 
social choice correspondence s is that extremely ne gative resul ts 
ensue, Theo1<:'1 3 .4 in Sen ( 1983 )  as wel l  as resul ts in Maskin ( 1 979 )  
and Da sgupta ,  Hammond and  Maskin ( 1 979 )  indica te that de cisive social 
choice correspondences are  impl ementable  by strong Nash equilibria .Q.!'. 
Nash equil ibria only if they are dicta torial . That resul t holds even 
if individual indifference is e xc l uded as a possibil ity . This l eads 
Sen ( 1983 ) to relax the implementation concept from impl ementabl e  to 
what he c a l ls  "pa rtial ly impl ementabl e , " A singl e-val ued social 
choice correspondence is partial ly implementable  by a decision 
mechanism if that mechanism has at l east one equilibrium that is the 
singl e member of the choice s e t .  The cost of impo sing this concept 
instead of  more traditional impl ementation standards is  carefully 
noted by Sen himsel f :  there is a pos sibility that "inoptimal"  
al terna tives  wil l be  s e l ected  a s  equil ibria by the decision mechanism . 
One can only hope , along with Sen,  that "with suitabl e  ' rul e s  o f  
behavior ' agreed  upon by  the individual s ,  their cooperative 
equilibrium may indeed l ead to the sel ection of the (desired )  outcome" 
( Sen  ( 1983 , p .  3 ) ) .  Even if this problem with partial implem enta tion 
is ignored, Theorem 4 . 1 1  and Corol l ary 4 , 1 6  in Sen ( 1 983 ) , the main 
resul t s  of that  pape r ,  indicate  that the coalitional structure ne eds 
to contain a great deal of veto power in order to guarantee  that a 
social choice correspondence is partial ly implementabl e by strong Nash 
equilibria.  
Ul timately,  the choice of restrictions is a value judgment ,  
One may be wil ling to tol erate both the potential probl ems with 
partial impl ementation and the re s trictions inherent in requiring 
de cisiveness in order to use a strong Nash equilibrium concep t ,  in 
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order to have the qua l i ty of d ec i s ivene ss  and to avoid impos ing 
neutral i ty .  None the l e s s ,  the pos i tive ch aracteriza t ion resul t s  proven 
here for full Nash impl ementa t ion are qui te prom ising , The scope of 
the po s i tive re sul ts compare favorably with the scope of other 
po s i tive resu l t s  in the l i tera ture , and the need to impo se neutral i ty 
to attain  the resu l t s  here seem s no more one rous than the  compromises 
required to ob tain  other po s i tive resul ts , 
II . DEFINITIONS,  ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATION 
Take the s e t  o f  social  al terna tives  to be A. When A i s  
f ini te ,  f A f  i s  the number  o f  members i n  A .  When A i s  a sub s e t  o f  
Euc l idean spa c e ,  d (A )  denotes  the dimension o f  A. 
A CCE subset  i s  a nonempty, compa ct ,  convex subset  of a 
Euc l idean spa ce , When A i s  a CCE subset  with d (A )  = m, then A i s  an
.m- CCE sub s e t .  It  i s  a s sumed that A contains  more than one 
a l t erna tive ,  so that there i s  a nontrivia l  social  choice problem , 
Whenever the na ture of A i s  un spe c i fied ,  it can be e i ther f ini t e  or a 
CCE-sub set . 
P i s  a preference rel a t ion on A i f  P is an a symmetric binary 
rel ation on A, i . e . , xPy and yPx c annot  both be true for x ,  y e  A .  I f  
they are both f a l se then xly , and xRy means that xPy or xly. When an 
indiv idual  i has  ta stes chara cterized by a preference r e l a t ion ,  that  
preference r e l a t i on sha l l  be denoted by Pi , R1 , and I i .
A preference rel a t i on is a weak order ing if R is trans i tive 
and compl e t e ,  A pre f erence relat ion i s  acyc l i c  i f  for a l l  
[ x  & A f xRy \/ y e A}  is the s et  o f  undominated a l t ernat ives for A
under P ,  A preference 
al terna ti ves that is a 
for every J( & S: 
(A)  the s e t  
and (D) the se t
rel  a t i  on , P, is cont inuous-valued over a 
sub s e t ,  S ,  o f  Eucl idean space if and only 
[y  e S f IPy} i s  an open s e t ;  
{ y  & S f yPx} is an open se t ,  
Suppose tha t  A i s  a CCE subse t  of a Eucl idean space ,  S .  Then a n  
s e t  
if  
1 0  
of 
indiv idua l ,  i, has !Yrul. l preferenc e s  i f  there exist s a "bl iss point" 
x ( in S but not ne ce s sari ly  in A )  such that yPiz i f  and only if
al terna tive y i s  c l oser in  Eucl ide an d i st ance to x than a l terna t ive  
1 z ,  When an indiv idual can have type I preference s with any b l i s s  
point in  S ,  then type I preference s are sai d  t o  b e  admi s s ib l e  for that 
individual ,  
The set  of a l l  individual s  in soc i e ty i s  I .  Throughout th i s  
art ic le  the s et  I wil l be taken to be f ini te with n member s .  wI i s
the product space  o f  indiv idual weak orderings for th e individual s  in 
society. Wl1en A is a CCE-sub s e t ,  i t  is assumed that type I 
prefer ence s are adm i s s ibl e for a l l  indiv idua l s .  
A soc i a l  func t ion i s  a mapping from WI into the set  of al l
preference rel ation s  on A,  A soc i a l  dec i s ion func t ion is a mapping 
from w1 into the set o f  al l acycl i c  preference re l a t ions on A .  
A profile  i s  a member of WI . For a prof i l e  p and  a ,  b e A ,  
def ine p ( a  ) b )  a s  t h e  s et  o f  individua ls who prefer a t o  b .  The 
concerned ill for p and the pa i r  of a l terna tives  [ a , b )  is 
p ( a  ) b) U p(b ) a ) , Let p and q be prof i l e s  and l e t  a, b ,  c, d e  A .
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A social  function , a ,  i s  neutral and monoton ic  when the fol low ing 
cond i t ion holds : if p(a ) b) � q( c ) d) and q ( d  ) c) � p(b ) a ) , then
aa ( p ) b  impl ies  ca ( q) d ,  If  the condi tion holds w i th equa l i t i e s  r a ther 
than inclus ions , then a is neutra l .  A b inary dec i s ion rule ,  a ,  i s  a 
so c i a l  funct ion that sa t i sf ies  the fol low ing property of b inaryne s s :  
i f  p ( a  ) b )  = q( a ) b )  and p (b ) a )  = q( b ) a )  then aa ( p ) b  impl i e s  
aa ( q) b ,  A soci a l  funct ion ,  a ,  i s  anonymous if  and only if for any 
permuta t i on y of ( 1 , 2, • • •  , n ) , a ( p1 , p2 , • •  , , pn ) = a ( py ( l ) '
P P ) where pi i s  the weak ordering of individual  i .y ( 2) ''" ' y (n )  
If J i s  a nonempty subset  of  I ,  then a s imple game on J is a
col l ect ion of sub s e t s  of J, rJ, such tha t :
( a )  A B rJ' A �  B =) B B rJ;
( b )  A e f =) Ac i f , where Ac i s  the complement o f  A i n  J,J J 
When property ( a )  i s  true , but prope rty ( b )  may or may not be true , f1 
i s  c a l l ed a monotonic game . When property ( b )  i s  true , but property 
( a )  may or not be true , rJ is cal led a .1!.!'.Qru<.! game . The null ( s impl e )  
game on J is the empty col l ect ion of sub s e t s  of J, If rJ i s  a proper
game on J, then r; = {E � JIEC B rJJ where EC i s  the compl ement of E
• in J, rJ often i s  c a l l ed the family of winning coal i t ions and rJ the
family of losing coa l it ion s .  Note tha t  under these de f inition s  in a 
given proper game f1, it may be true tha t  a coa l i t ion E � J is ne i ther
w inning nor los ing ,  
A di rect sum of s imple game s i s  an indexed family crJJ IJe2 
such that : 
( i ) rJ i s  a simpl e game for J (poss ibly nul l ) ;
( i i )  for a l l  K, L e  21 , if Ki; L, then fL 0 2
K i; fK;
I • • ( i i i ) for a l l  K, L e  2 , if Ki; L, then fK i; fL,
Every collect ion of .1!.!'.Qru<.! game s ,  r = cr1J I where e a c h rJ i s  aJe2 
proper game ,  generates  .!!.!! aggrega t ion rule ,  µr, where for every
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b )  B prof i l e  p and al terna tives a ,  b e A, aµr(p )b  i f  and on ly if p ( a  
fp ( a )b )Up (b )a )' I . e . , the s e t  of indiv idua l s  who prefer  a over b i s a 
w inning coa l i tion in the proper game def ine d on the se t of individua l s  
concerne d about a ver sus b .  If  a i s  a social  function and J i; K ,  then
J is s a id  to be a deci s ive sub s e t  for! ( wi th re spe ct to a) if for all
profi le s  p where K is  the  concerne d s e t ,  J !:: p(a  ) b )  => aa ( p )b , for
a l l  a ,  b e A .  The set  of all  dec i s ive subse t s  for K i s  the dec i s ive
When a soc i a l  function is generated  by a d i rec t  sum of 
simpl e gam e s ,  r, then fJ i s  the deci s ive set for J i; I. A social
functi on is  s imple  i f  for  any x, y & A, xPy if and only if  a l l  the
members  of at l ea st one of the coa l itions in the de c i s ive  s et  for I 
prefer x to y .  When a s impl e soc i a l  function i s  generated  by r, a 
J d i rect  sum of s impl e games  then for J !:: I fJ = r1 0 2 . A pre f i lter  
on J i s  a s impl e game ,  rJ' on J such that  n rJ # 0 and rJ is  not a
nul l  game .  For a prefi l te r ,  rJ, on J, the set  0 rJ i s  c a l led  the
r i l  r J such that E,col legium for J' A f i l t er  on J i s  a pref ter ,  J' on 
F B rJ =) En F B rJ. An ultraf i l t er  on J i s  a f il te r ,  rJ. on J such
tha t  for all E � J e i ther E B rJ or E
C 
& rJ where E
C is the compl ement
of E in J. 
f WI -> A, AA soc ial  cho ice corre spondence f is a mapping : 
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social choice corre spondence may be  mul tipl e-valued ,  The image se t of 
a soc i a l  choi ce corre sponde nce f under a prof i l e  p of weak orderings 
is denoted  f ( p )  and is cal l ed  the cho ice � of f for prof i l e  p .  Le t
I T be the se t of a l l  p e W such that there i s  some j e I and some 
x e A such that for a l l  i e I / ( j )  x P,y for a l l  y e A/Ix ) and therep p 1 p 
i s  a t  most one z e A/Ix } such that z R . x  • A so c i a l  cho icep J p 
corre spondence i s  minima l ly democra t i c  i f  for al l p e T f ( p )  = (x ) .p 
I . e . , for II I = n if x i s a t  the top of n - 1 individual s '  wea k
orderings and i s  a t  worst se cond in  t h e  remaining individual ' s  weak 
ordering,  then the choice se t must  con s i st of x a l one , 
Consider  the mapping f ' : w1 -> A w i th f ' ( q) = U (A, P) where a 
is a soc i a l  function, a ( q) = P, a preference r e l ation,  and U (A , P ) i s  
the  s e t  of undomina ted a l ternativ e s  in  A under P. Thi s  mapping f '  i s  
a soc i a l  choi ce corre spondence . When thi s  a r t i c l e  speaks of a social  
funct ion a a s  a soc i a l  cho ice corre spondence ,  the mapping f '  i s  meant , 
Let R ( a , b )  = ( i  e I l aR,b ) under the prof i l e  p of weakp 1 
order ings for the s et  I of a l l  members  of  soci e ty and for a ,  b e A. A 
soc i a l  choice corre spondence f i s  Maskin monotonic  i f  for any prof i le s  
p and  q of weak  orderings a nd any a e A,  a e f (p )  = >  a e f ( q) if  
R ( a , b )  :! R ( a , b )  for a l l  b e A.  I . e . , a soc i a l  choi ce corre spondenceq p 
f i s  Maskin monotonic  when for any transformation T :  p -> q of 
preference prof i l e s ,  if a i s  in  the choi ce s et  of f for p ,  then i t  i s  
i n  the choice s e t  of f for q if  a i s  not demoted in any indiv idua l ' s
weak ordering , Not demoted means that aRib under p impl i e s  aR1b under
q .  
1 4  
A social  choi ce corre spondence , f ,  has the prope rty NY!'. if and
only if for any prof i l e  p of indiv i dual  weak orderings if there exi s t s  
i e I a n d  a e A such that for a l l  j e I where j I i aR . b  for al l b e A 
J 
then a e f ( p ) . I . e . , i f  an a l terna tive i s  a t  the top of n - 1 
indiv idua l s '  preference orderings , then the last indiv idual  cannot 
prevent the al terna tive from being in the choice se t .  
s 
Le t S i denote  a strategy space for ind iv idual i and l e t
n 
fl S .  be the product space of the indiv idual strategy space s ,  A
j=l J 
dec i s ion mechani sm d i s  a s ingl e-val ued  mapping from S to A .  A 
de c i s ion mechani sm i s  c a l l ed a direct  mechanism if S i = P• or a sub s e t
o f  P• for a l l  i e I ,  where P• i s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  po s s ib l e  preference
re l a tions over A, A dec i s ion mechani sm is an indirect  mechanism if 
for some j e I Sj i s  not P• or any sub s e t  of P•.
Let s denote ( s1 , s2 , ,  • •  , sn ) ,  i , e . , al l individu a l s  choose
thei r  barred s trate g i e s .  Le t ;/s i denote (;1 ,;2 , . , , ,;i-l '
s i , s i+l ' ' ' ' ' sn ) '  i . e . ,  al l indiv idual s  choose barred s tra t eg i e s  except 
ind iv idual  i who choo s e s  s i e S i . Now s e S is a Na sh equil ibr ium of
dec i sion me chani sm d if for a l l  i e I, d (;)R id (;/s i ) for a l l  s i e S i .
I . e . , s e S i s  a Nash equil ibrium i f  no indiv idual can uni l a ter a l ly 
change h i s  or her s trate gy and be better  off if a l l  other individual s 
cont inue p l aying s j e sj .
Le t ;/s c denote  the case where a l l  i e C choose unbarred
strategi e s ,  si e S i and all  j i C choose barred s trate g i e s  sj e Sj .
Now , s e S i s  a s trong Na sh  equ i l ibrium of de ci s ion mechani sm d i f  
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e C,  
A social  choi ce corre spondence f :  w 1  ->  A i s  implementable  by
dec i s ion mechani sm d i f  
( 1 )  
and ( 2 )  
I for any equil ibrium s of d w i th respe ct  to a prof ile  p e W ,
d ( s )  e f ( p ); 
I if f ( p )  i s  nonempty for a prof i l e  p e W , then d has  a t
l ea st one equil ibrium unde r p .  
A social  choice  corre spondence f :  w1 -> A i s  ful ly 
impl ementable  by dec i s i on mechani sm d if  
( 1 )  for any equil ibrium, s ,  o f  d w i th respect to  a prof ile  
P e WI, d ( s )  e f ( p );
and ( 2 )  for any prof i l e  p of individual wea k  orderings and any 
a e f ( p )  there exi st s an  s e S such that d(  s )  = a ,
Each o f  the se impl ementa t ion concept s only make s sense when a n  
equil ibrium concept i s  spe c if ied .  When the equi l ibrium concept  i s  
Nash equil ibrium, then  the terminology ful ly Nash implementab le  means 
that the Nash equil ibr i a  of the d ec i s ion mechani sm ful ly impl ement the 
soc i a l  cho i ce proce s s  for all profi le s  in w1, Nash implementable ,  
ful ly s trong Nash  implementable ,  and s trong Nash implementab l e  are 
def ine d s imilarly,  
III . FULL NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES OVER 
CCE SUBSET ALTERNATIVE SETS 
Ma skin  ( 1 97 7 )  and Maskin ( 1979)  provide a s e t  of re sul ts for 
ful l impl ement at ion of soc ial  choi ce corre spondence s by Nash and 
strong Nash equil ibr i a  when the al terna tive s et  is f ini te .  By Theorem 
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2 in Ma skin ( 1977 )  Maskin monoton i c i ty is a ne ces sary cond i tion for a 
social  choice corre spondence to be ful ly Nash impl ementabl e ,  A 
pa rallel  re sul t ,  Theorem 1 in Ma skin ( 197 9)  i s  that  Ma skin 
monotoni c i ty is a nece s sary cond i t i on for a social choi ce 
corre spondence to be ful ly strong Nash impl ementabl e .  The proof s of 
both resul t s  do not depend on the al terna tive set being f inite , and 
thus both re sul t s  apply when the al terna tive s et  is a CCE- subse t ,  The 
fol l owing theorem therefore hold s  true , 
Theorem 1· (Maskin ( 1 97 7 ) ; Maskin ( 1979) ) ,  If a social choi ce 
corre spondence f over  a f inite  a l terna tive s et  or over a CCE subse t  
a l terna tive s et  i s  fully Nash impl ementabl e or fully strong Nash 
implementable ,  then f i s  Maskin monoton i c ,  
M a  skin ' s proof o f  h i s  Theorem 5 in  Ma  skin ( 1977 )  that  M a  skin 
monotoni ci ty and NVP are j ointly suf f ic i ent for a soci a l  choi ce 
corre spondence to be  ful ly  Nash impl ementable  doe s depe nd on  the 
al terna t ive  se t being f in i t e ,  The main t a sk of thi s  section i s  to 
show that h i s  resu l t  s t i l l  hold s  when the a l terna tive se t i s  a CCE 
subse t ,  Ma skin ' s  proof o f  h i s  Theorem 5 i s  b y  construct ion and r e s t s  
o n  h i s  Theorem 4 in t h e  same pape r ,  Tha t theorem and the construct ive
proof of Theorem S ut i l iz e  a par t i cul ar strategy space for
individual s ,  In pa rt icul ar ,  where the soc ial  choice corre spondence i s  
f ,  the strategy se t for individual i i s  
i s  a prof ile o f  weak orderings and a e f ( p ) ] , 
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Thus , ea.· indiv idual choose s ( 1 )  a prof i l e  that has a nonempty choi ce 
se t under f and ( 2 )  an e l ement in the choice s et  for that prof i l e .  
The prof ile  cho sen  b y  i may mi srepresent the true preference s of  
others  as  wel l  a s  m i srepre sent i ng i ' s own true pref erence s .  Ma skin 
al so def ine s the l ower contour set of Ri a t  a e A a s  L ( a ,  R1 )
(b e A I a R. b ]  • 
1 
Theorem 4 in Maskin ( 1977 )  i s  now restated  a s  Theorem 2 here . 
Theorem 1· <Masti n  ( 1977 ) ) ,  For I I I 2. 3 and a social  choice
correspondence f that is Maskin monotonic  and sat i sf i e s  NVP, the 
fol l owing three cond i t ions are j ointly suff i c ient for f to be ful ly  
Nash implementabl e  by  a deci s ion mechani sm d :  S ->  A .  
( 1 ) If every individual  choos e s  the same strate gy s i 
(�,. • •  , Rn, a) ,  then the de c i s ion mechani sm choose s a ,
( 2 )  I f  a l l  individual s except i choose the same strategy 
( R1 , • •  , , Rn,a )  then i can reach any point in L( a , R1) by
some s trategy si e S i , I . e . ,  {b e A l b = 
d ( s1 , • • • , s2 , , , , , si ' '''' sn ) and si e Sil =  L( a , Ri ) ,
( 3 )  I f  at l e a s t  two indiv idual s have d i fferent s tategi e s ,  then 
any third  indiv idual ,  j, can cause the out come of the 
dec i s ion mechani sm to be  .l!.!!Y al ternative in  A by choosing a n
appropriate sj e sj .
After prov ing Theorem 2 ,  Maskin prove s the j oint suff ic iency of Ma skin 
monotonic i ty and NVP for a social choice corre spondence to be fully 
Nash impl ementabl e by construct ing a de c i s i on mechani sm for a l l  social 
choi ce corr e spondence s that meets  ( 1 ) -( 3 )  in Theorem 2 .  As Theorem 3 ,  
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thi s  s e c t ion proves  Maski n ' s j oint  suff iciency re sul t for f inite  
a l terna t ive  s e t s  us ing a d i fferent construct ion than Ma skin used ,  
That d i fferent construct ion  is  then  al tered so  that  i t  app l i e s  for  CCE 
sub s e t  a l terna t ive  se t s .  
Theorem 3 ( Ma stin ( 1 977 ) ) .  If I I I  L 3 ,  A i s  f inite  and a soc ial
choice corre spondence f s a t i s f i e s  NVP, then f is ful ly Nash 
implementabl e by a dec i s i on mechan i sm if and only if f is  Ma skin 
monotonic ,  
Proof : By Theorem 1 if f i s  ful ly Nash impl ementabl e ,  then f i s  
Ma skin monoton i c ,  
The fol l owing proof that Mastin monoton i c i ty and NVP imply 
tha t  f is ful ly Nash implementab l e  is by a construct ion s imi l ar  to 
that in Ma skin ( 1977 ,  pp . 21-22 ) . Spe c i f i ca l ly, only ( B) in the 
dec i s ion mechanism constructed b e l ow differs  f rom Ma skin ' s 
construct ion.  
First,  label  the a l ternativ e s  in  the a l ternative se t A = 
( a (O) , , , , ,a (m  - 1 ) ] , Now consider  the fol lowing dec i s ion mechani sm d: 
S - )  A where  S i for each i e A i s  a s  stated in the paragraph above
The orem 2 supra, 
(A )  s =2 s n
( R1 , . .  . , Rn,a( r) ) F s i = ( R1 , . .  . ,Rn, a ( s ) ) ,
s n
d ( s 1 , . . .  ,sn) = a ( s )  if a(r)R ia ( s )  and a ( r ) otherw i se ,
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( C ) If a l l  indiv idual s p i ck one of two s trategies  and more than 
one p icks each of the two strate g i e s  or i f  there exi s t s  a 
tripl e ( i , j , k) such that si I sj I sk F s i ,
n 
d ( sl "" ' sn) = a (mod ( m--1 ) <b1 tr ) )  where
s =i 
then l e t  
w i th a x  the l arge s t  mul tipl e o f  x l e s s  than o r  equal to y .  
Thi s  construc t ion compl e te ly def ine s d .  The deci sion  mechani sm d 
s a t i s f i e s  ( 1 ) of Theorem 2 b e ca use  of ( A ) . Now by ( B) any indiv idual 
i who devi a t e s  f rom ( R1 , , , , , Rn, a ) ,  the strategy common to the other
indiv idual s ,  can obtain any a l te rnative in  the l ower contour se t of R1
at  a .  Thus , the construction meets  ( 2 )  of Theorem 2 .  
When a ny two indiv idual s  have different s trategies ,  then for 
each a ( v) e A any th ird individual i can sel ect a strategy si d i s t inct
from each of the f irst  two and s i w i l l  con s i st of a prof i l e  p and an 
a l terna t ive  a ( v) such that a ( v) e f ( p ) . ( Note tha t  by NVP, there a re 
at l ea st n + 1 profi l e s  that wil l re sul t in any a e A be ing in the 
choice set for any social  choice corre spondence f,  Spe c i f ic a l ly ,  a l l  
the prof il e s  t h a t  have a a t  the top of the w e a k  orde rings of  a t  l ea st 
n - 1 indiv idual s  w i l l  re sul t in a be ing in the choice  se t ,  and wi th 
two or more a l terna tives  there a re a t  l east  n + 1 such prof il e s , ) 
n 
Thus individu a l  i can cause the sum [ tr in ( C )  to b e  any of mr=l 
consecutive integers  since i can se l ect an si such tha t  ti = 0 ,  
ti = 1 , , , , , or ti = m - 1 .  I t  fol l ows from ( C ) that  i can cause  any
alterna tive in A to  be the out come under the decision  mechanism by 
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choosing an appropriate  si . Thus ,  condi t ion ( 3 )  of Theorem 2 is  m e t ,
Q. E. D. 
Jn orde r to e xtend the construct ion in the proof of Theorem 3 
to the case  of a CCE sub s e t  a l terna tive s e t ,  the most impor tant task  
i s  to revi se condi t i on ( C ) . Condi t ion ( C )  depends on the abi l i ty to 
l abel  n a l terna tiv e s  by po s i tive integer s  s tarting with one and e nding 
wi th n. The fo l lowing theorem extends the re sul t of The orem 3 to CCE 
subse t  a l terna tive s e t s  by al tering condit ion ( C )  in the proof wi thout 
affect ing the appl icabil i ty of Theorem 2 .  
Theorem 4 :  I f  each individual we ak order ing can  have any a l terna tive 
at the top of  the orde ring, if I I I  2. 3 ,  if A is a CCE subse t and i f  a 
social  choice corre spondence f s a t i sf i e s  NVP, then f is ful ly Nash 
impl ementab l e  by  a deci sion mechani sm if and only if f is Ma skin 
monotonic .  
Proof :  By  Theorem 1 if f i s  ful ly Nash  impl ementabl e ,  th en f i s  
Maskin monotoni c ,  
In order t o  show that  Maskin monotoni c i ty and NVP imply that f 
i s  ful ly Nash impl ementabl e ,  a deci sion mechani sm sa ti sfying (A)  and 
( B) in the proof of The orem 3 can be used,  but condi tion (C) in  that 
proof must be  a l tered,  Thi s  proof deve lops a new condition ( C ' ) t o  
repl ace (C )  and  then demonstrates  tha t  (A) , (D) and ( C ' ) generate  a
decis ion mechani sm that mee t s  the condit ions of Theorem 2 ,  
Suppo se A has dimens ion m .  I . e . , A is  an m-CCE subse t .  A i s  
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embedded in Em, and since A is compact and convex, for each point
x e mm not in A there is a point y e A such that y is the point in A
closest to x if x ;, A. Define a function Q : mm --) A such that 
Q(x) = x if x e A and Q(x) = y where y is the point in A closest to x 
if x ;, A .  Let each alternative a e A be a vector characterized b y  m 
coordinates in the coordinate system of Em :::i A.
For a social choice correspondence f let the strategy space 
for .�ch individual i be 
s� = {(R1,.,. ,Rn' a, bl lb s m
m and a s f(R1,. • •  ,Rn)}. 
I I 
Denote as si, the ith individual's choice from Si, and let si be the
vector of all components of si but the last. Let the last two
I 
components of si be denoted ai and bi respectively,
Define condition (C') as follows: 
(C') If (1) the set T = (s1, • • •  ,sn) consists of two subsets T1 
and T2 such that T1 + T2 = T, IT1 I L 2, IT2 I L 2, and for 
and si F sk or (2) there exists a triple (i,j,k) such that 
I I n 
si I sJ
. I sk F si' then let d(s1,. • •  ,s ) = Q( [ b ).n w=l w 
This condition along with conditions (A) and (B) from the proof of 
Theorem 3 completely define a decision mechanism d: S' -> A where S' 
n I 
is the product space n S . •  Note that conditions (A)  and (B) operate
i=l 1 
only on the portion si of each si. I.e., bi' the last vector 
I 
component of si' is ignored in applying (A)  and (B). For example, if 
I 
si = (R1,. • .,Rn' a, bi) and bj F bk for some j, k e I, then condition 
I I 
(A)  will still be satisfied and d(s1, . • •  ,sn) a. Note also that 
although condition (C') makes reference to the bi components, in 
determining whether condition (C') applies instead of (A )  or (B) 
reference is made only to the si portion of si. 
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The proof of Theorem 2 as Theorem 4 in Maskin (1977) relies on 
three properties: a e f(R1, • . •  ,Rn)' f is Maskin monotonic, and f 
satisfies NVP. The proof is unaffected by shifting the individual 
I 
strategy space for each individual i from Si to Si as long as the
applicability of conditions (1), (2) and (3) depend only on the si 
I 
portion of each vector si since that portion is a member of Si. In 
other words, adding an extra vector component bi to each si B Si makes 
no operational difference in the proof if (1), (2) and ( 3 )  do not 
involve that extra vector component. 
It is important to check, then, that (1), (2), and ( 3 )  can be 
I 
made to depend only on the si portion of the si vectors. There is no
problem with (1) and (2). Both of these conditions can be interpreted 
I 
in terms of the si portion of the si vectors. So when either (
1) or
(2) refer to si or si these should be understood to mean the si and si 
I -1 
portions of si and si respectively. 
There is, however, one subtlety in interpreting the conditions 
I 
of Theorem 2 when the individual strategy sets are Si instead of Si. 
Condition ( 3 )  of Theorem 2 applies "if at least two individuals have 
different strategies." This is to be interpreted as "if at least two 
individuals h and i have sh F si." In other words, the individuals 
I 
need only hove strategies that differ on the sk portion of the sk 
vectors, If it is true that sh = si for all h, i e I, then ( 3 )  does
not apply. On the other hand, if ( 3 )  does apply the result will be 
that any third individual j can cause the outcome of the decision 
mechanism to be .!U!Y alternative in A by choosing an appropriate 
I 
The b. component in s. matters for this choice, 
J J 
So the only place where ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , or ( 3 )  in Theorem 2 depend 
I 
on the bi portion of the si is in part of ( 3 ) , But that dependence
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does not matter. The condition ( 3 )  specifies that when it applies, a 
third individual j can force the decision mechanism to select any 
outcome in A by appropriate choice of a strategy vector. The 
condition and the proof of the theorem are not concerned with how this 
power • the third individual arises. In particular, that power can 
come about through an extra component in the strategy vector, For the 
purposes of Theorem 2 it only matters that the power exists. 
The three properties (A), (B), and (C') completely specify a 
decision mechanism d. Now that it is clear that changing the 
I 
individual strategy sets to Si has no effect on the operation of 
Theorem 2 if conditions ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) and ( 3 )  in that theorem are 
interpreted properly, it remains to show that (A), (B), and (C') 
satisfy these conditions in their properly interpreted form. 
The decision mechanism satisfies condition ( 1 ) of Theorem 2 by 
(A), As long as any individual can choose a weak ordering that puts 
any alternative at the top of the ordering, then by NVP and (B), 
condition ( 2 )  of Theorem 2 is satisfied, Finally by (C') when any two 
individuals i and 
n 
have s. I s. any third individual k can make [ b 
1 J w=l w 
be any vector in Em given that all b. for i I k remain unchanged, 
1 
I I 
Thus, by choosing an appropriate sk e Sk k can cause the game to 
produce any alternative in the alternative set. 
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Q.E.D. 
The condition in Theorem 4 that any individual be able to 
choose an individual weak ordering that puts any alternative t e A at 
the top of that weak ordering is not very restrictive. For example, 
given that type I preferences are admissible for individual i, i can 
simply choose bliss point t to insure that t will be at the top of i's 
weak ordering. 
IV. CllARACT'ERIZING HILLY IMPLEMENTABLE NEUTRAL SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
The first task in this section is to show that neutral social 
functions that are Maskin monotonic are neutral monotonic social 
functions. In the beginning that task, the following lemma is useful: 
Lemma 1 .  A neutral social function is characterized by a collection 
of proper games: 
(a) If f is a collection of proper games then µf' the 
aggregation rule generated by r. is a neutral social 
function, 
(b) If a is a neutral social function, then there exists a 
unique collection of proper games, r. such that a = µr· the 
aggregation rule generated by r. 
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Proof: (a) Suppose r is a collection of proper games. Suppose that 
aµJ"> for some a, b e A and some profile p e WI. Dy the definition of 
µr it follows that p(a > b) e r1 where J = p(a > b) U p(b > a). But 
• 
since rJ is a proper game, p(b > a) i rJ and thus it is not true that 
Since aµr'> => bµra is not true, µr is a social function. Since 
µr is generated by a proper game, which coalitions win or lose is 
independent of the particular pair of alternatives being compared, As 
a result, µr is neutral. 
(b) If a is a neutral social function, a is a neutral binary 
decision rule since neutrality implies binaryness, Ferejohn and 
Fishburn ( 197 9)  show as their Theorem 1 that for any binary decision 
rule, the set of winning coalitions for any concerned set and any pair 
of alternatives is a "binary constitution." A binary constitution 
guarantees that for any pair of alternatives x, y e A, if coalition W 
is a w;-"ting coalition then its. complement L in the concerned set will 
be a losing coalition, When there is a binary constitution, the 
collection of winning coalitions for x versus y for a given concerned 
set satisfies the criterion of a proper game. In particular, if a 
given coalition wins in a proper game, then its complement in the 
concerned set does not win. But a binary constitution structure does 
not yield a proper game for each concerned set. The reason is that 
different coalitions may win for a given concerned set depending on 
which two alternatives are being compared. This possibility is 
eliminated by assuming neutrality since neutrality guarantees that the 
set of winning coalitions for a given concerned set does not depend on 
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which two alternatives are being compared. Thus, Ferej ohn and 
Fishburn's Theorem 1 and the additional assumption of neutrality yield 
the result that for any neutral binary decision rule, the set of 
winning coalitions for each concerned set is a proper game, 
Now suppose that there are two distinct collections of proper 
games, r and r and that a = µr and a = µ_ where a is a neutral binary r 
decision rule. Since r and r are distinct assume (without loss of 
generality) that for some J C I there exists a coalition E such that 
E e f1/r1. Consider two alternatives x, y e A. Choose a profile 
p e WI such that p(x > y) = E, p(y > x )  = J/E. (Such a profile can be 
easily constructed even when A is a CCE subset if type I preferences 
are admissible for all individuals. E.g., let members of E have bliss 
point x, members of J/E have bliss point y and members of I/J have a 
bliss point equidistant from x and y.) Now since E e f1 and µ_ 
r 
xay. But E � r1 and µr = a imply that xay is not true, a 
contradiction, Thus, r, the collection of proper games such that 
µr = a, must be unique. 
a, 
Q, E .D .  
Given that the set of winning coalitions for each concerned 
set is a proper game, the next step is to show that all the proper 
games are simple games, The following lemma accomplishes that goal. 
The proof of that lemma as well as the four succeeding lemmas is by 
counterexample. It is important to be sure that the counterexamples 
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are acceptable even under the most severe restrictions o n  preferences 
used in the rest of the article. To that end, the proof of each lemma 
is accompanied by a demonstration that the particular profiles used ns 
counterexamples in the proof are consistent with profiles of weak 
orderings in the finite alternative set case and with profiles of weak 
orderings that admit type I preferences when the alternative set is a 
CCE subset, 
Lemma 2 :  If a neutral social function is Maskin monotonic, then any 
proper game representing a set of winning coalitions for a given 
concerned set is a simple game, 
Proof: Call the neutral social function f so that its choice set 
under profile r is f(r), To show that a proper game representing the 
set of winning coalitions under f for a given concerned set is 11 
simple game, it is only necessary to show that it is a monotonic game, 
For a concerned set II t;; I label as r11 the proper game associated with 
that concerned set, Assume that a proper game, rJ, with respect to
some concerned set J t;; I is not a monotonic game, Then either 
or 
\l . .' there exists a coalition C e rJ such that for some D � C,
( 2 )  there exists a coalition E e rJ such that for some G � E,
G t rJ and J/G t rJ. 
The first part of this proof will show that ( 1 )  and ( 2 )
contradict Mnskin monotonicity by using p ,  q, u and v, four particular 
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profiles o f  weak orderings, in the case where the alternative set is 
finite, Let the profiles used have the following traits where n, 
b e A: ( 1 ' )  J is the concerned set for a versus b; ( 2 ' )  for all i e J, 
aPic and bP1c for all c e A where c i {a, b),
Under a profile of this type, note that for x e [a, b) and 
y e  A/[a, b) I [i e I l xP. y). As a first step, it is important to 1 
verify that 0 t r1• Under that condition, there will be no 
c e A/ [a, b) such that cPd where de [a, b), In other words, a will be 
in the choice set unless bPa, and b will be in the choice set unless 
aPb. 
Consider two profiles r and s, Under profile r for all i e I 
and all x, y e A, xliy' Under profile s for all i e I and for all 
x e A/ [z) zPix, but for all i e I and for all x, y e A/ (z) xliy'
Under profile r no one is concerned about any binary choice so that 
the concerned set is 0, Since r0 is a proper game and since 0 is the 
complement of itself in r0, it must be true that 0 t r0. As a result, 
under r there is social indifference between all alternatives, and all 
alternatives are in the choice set. Now suppose 0 e r1• Then under 
profile s, z t f(s) since xPz for all x e A/ [z). The transformation r 
-) s is such that z is not demoted in any individual's weak ordering, 
Maskin monotonicity requires that z e f(r) =) z e f(s) so that 
z i f(s) is a contradiction, 
Now consider case ( 1 ) . Under a profile p let C = [i l aP. b),1 
Since C e rJ, a e f(p), Change the profile such that the new profile 
q has D (i faPib), Since J/D e rJ, bPa and a i f( q), The 
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transformation from p to q doe s not  demote a in  anyone ' s  weak orde ring 
s ince the set  l i l bP . a) doe s not expand under the transformati on. Yet
1 
a t f ( q) which contradi c t s  Maskin monoton i c i ty ,
Similar reasoning shows that ( 2 ) l eads t o  a contradic t ion of 
Maskin monoton i c i ty .  Let G = {i lbP .a )  under prof i l e  u ,  and l e t
1 
E = {i l bP . a) under prof i l e  v .  Now a e f ( u ) but a t  f ( v) , But the1 
transformation from u to v does not demote a in anyone ' s  weak ordering 
s ince the set {i l bP . a)  doe s not expand under the transformation.1 
Thus,  a e f ( u} and a t f ( v} contradict s  Maskin monoton i c i ty .  
The f irst part of the  proof i s  now compl e te: ( 1 ) and ( 2 )  each 
l ead to a contrad i c t i on of  Maskin monoton i c i ty for the f inite  
al ternat ive set  case when individual preferences can be any weak 
ordering.  
The second par t of the proof pre sent s  type I preference 
profi l e s  over CCE subset  al ternative sets that cause each of ( 1 ) and 
( 2 )  to l ead to a contradict ion of Maskin monoton i c i ty .  Choose x, 
y e A where A i s  a CCE sub s e t .  In  case ( 1 ) s e t  up two prof i l e s ,  
Under pro f i l e  p al l member s o f  C have type I pre ferences  with x as  a 
b l i s s  po int , members  of J/C have type I preference s with y as a bl i s s  
po int,  and member s  of  I/J are indi fferent be tween any two alternat ives  
in A .  Under prof i l e  q members  of  D have type I preference s with x as
a b l i s s  po int , members  of J/D have type I preference s with y as a 
bl i s s  v�:�t. and members of I/J are indifferent between any two 
al ternativ e s  in A .  
The fol l owing arguments e s tabl i sh that x e f (p ) , For 
z e A/ ( x )  there are three case s :
<A> I z - y I 
( B) I z - y I 
( C ) I z - y l  
I x  y l  where l ' I i s  Euc l idean d i s tance; 
I x - y l ;  
I x  - y l . 
Under p in case (A) , C = {i l xP . z )  and J/C1 
C e rJ' xPz for al l z e A where (A)  holds . 
l i l zP . x ) . S ince1 
In case ( D}, J = l i l xP . z )  and D = l i l zP . x ) . Cons ider two
1 1 
pro f i l e s  g and h ,  Under prof i l e  g for all i e I and al l a ,  b e A, 
aiib .  Under pro f i l e  h al l i B J have type I preference s with b l i s s
po int a and for al l  i B I /J and al l b ,  c e A ,  bI . c, Under prof i l e  g1 
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no one i s  concerne d about any b inary choi ce s o  that the concerned s e t  
i s  0. Since r0 i s  a proper game and s ince 0 i s  t h e  compl ement of
i tse l f  in  0 it  must be true that 0 t r0. As  a re sul t ,  under g there
is soc ial indifference be tween all al ternative s ,  and al l al ternatives  
are in the  choice s et .  Now suppose 0 e rJ for J � I ,  Then under
pro f i l e  h,  a t  f ( h) s ince bPa for al l b e  A/ fa ) ,  The transformation
g � h i s  such that a i s  not demoted in any individual ' s  weak
ordering.  Mas kin monoton i c i ty requires a e f ( g )  => a e f ( h} so that
a t f ( h} is a contradic t ion, Thus , 0 t rJ. For all  z e A for whi ch
case ( B} appl i e s ,  xRz . 
In case ( C}, C li l xP . z )  and D = l i l zP . x ) , By an argument1 1 
s imilar to that for case ( Il}, 0 t re. Thus , whenever case ( C} holds
for z e A, xRz . 
Combining the ana ly s i s  of the three case s ,  it i s  true that xRz 
where any of (A) , ( D} or ( C ) hold , But those case s  are exhaus tive so 
that x e f ( p ) . 
Under prof ile  q consider the binary choi ce be tween x and y .  
The concerne d set  i s  J and J/D = C i l yPix } . Since J/D e rJ' yPx and
xi f ( q) . Since the only change in individual prof i l e s  in the 
transformation p � q is  in the group D/C and s ince member s  in that
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group switch the ir  bl i s s  point from y t o  x under the transformation, x 
i s  not demoted in any indiv idual ' s  weak orde ring by the 
transformation. By Maskin monotoni c i ty it must be true that x e f ( p )  
=> x e f ( q) .  Thus,  xi f ( q) violates Maskin mono t onicity .  
Now consider the fo l lowing prof iles  u and v for  case ( 2 ) . 
Under profi le  u, E i s  a s e t  of indiv idual s who have type I preference s
wi th bl i s s  point y, indiv idual s in J/E have type I preference s with 
b l i s s  po int x, and individual s in I/J are indifferent be tween any two 
al ternatives  in A. Under prof i l e  v ,  G is a s et  of individual s  who 
have type I preferences with bl i s s  point y, individual s in J/G have 
type I preference s with bl i s s  point x, and individual s in I/J are 
indifferent be tween any two al terna tives in A .  
The f ol l owing arguments  e stabl i sh that x e f ( v) . For 
z e A/ {x ) there are three case s :  
(A)  I z Y I  < I x  y l  where l ' I  i s  Euc l idean di stance;
( B) I z - y f  
( C ) I z y l  
I x  - y l ;  
I x  y l .  
Under v in case (A) , G = C i l zP . x ) and J/G
1 
xRz for a l l  z e A where (A) holds . 
Jn ca se ( B) , J = [ i l xP . z ) and(! 
1 
[ i l zP . x) , Since case ( 1 )  i s1 
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rul ed out by Maskin monot on ici ty, E e rJ => (! t rJ so that J cannot be
a l os ing coa l i t i on f or concerned set J, It  fol l ows that xRz for al l 
z e A where ( B) holds . 
In case ( C ) , J/G = { i l xPizl and(! = { i l zPix ) . S ince case ( 1)
is rul ed out by Maskin monotonici ty and s ince rJ/G is a proper game,
• 
0 e rJ/G cannot be true . ((J e rJ/G => J/G e rJ/G s ince rJ/G i s  a
• prope r gam e ,  But 0 e rJ/G and J/G e rJ/G fal l s  wi thin case ( 1 ) , and
case ( 1 )  has been shown to be impo ss ibl e . )  Thus , e i ther J/G e rJ/G or
J/G t rJ/G and (! t rJ/G' It fol l ows that xRz for al l z e A where ( C )
hol ds . 
Combining the  analysi s of the three case s ,  it i s  true that xRz 
where any of (A ) , ( B) or ( C )  hol d .  But those ca se s  are exh aust ive, so 
x e f ( v) . 
The transformation v -> u involves changing the preference s of 
only one group, G/E. The se indiv idual s switch thei r  bl i s s  point from 
y to x so that x i s not demoted in any indiv idual ' s  weak ordering by 
the transformati on. Maskin monotonic i ty requires that 
x e f ( v) => x e f ( u ) . Under prof ile  u ,  E { i lyP . x ) and J/E1 
{ i l xP1yJ . E e  rJ => yPx, and therefore x t f ( u ) .
Q.E.D. 
I.emma 2 state s that a Maskin monot onic neutral soc ial function 
i s  characterized by a simple  game for each conce rne d s e t ,  Mnskin 
monotonic i ty further impl i e s  that these s impl e games  form a direct  sum 
of simple  gam e s ,  Before proving that re sul t as Lemma 5, i t  i s  
convenient to  devel op two intermediate re sul ts a s  Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 .  
Lemma 3, If a ne utral social function  i s  Maskin monotonic ,  and for
some C t;; J t;; I i t  i s  true that C e r1, the simple  game for conce rne d  
s e t  J ,  then J/C i rK for any Kt;: I where rK is the s impl e  game for
concerned set K, 
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Proo f :  Call  the ne utral soc ial funct ion f so t h a t  f ( r ) is t h e  choi ce 
se t of f for prof i l e  r, Denote as rK the s impl e  game corre sponding to 
f for concerne d  set  K, 
The f irst  part of the proof e stabl i she s  Lemma 3 when A i s  a
f inite  a l terna tive s et  and individual preference s are weak orderings , 
Two prof i l e s  p a nd q of weak orderings  over A w i l l  be used,  and they 
wi l l  both have the proper ty tha t  for c e A/Ca , b } , aP . c  and bP . c  for1 1 
al l i e I ,  Since rI i s  a simpl e game ,  0 t rI. ( If 0 e rI' then
I t rI s ince rI is a proper game , But 0 e rI => I e rI since r1 
is a
monotonic game , )  As a re sul t ,  a wil l be in the choice s et  unl e s s  bPa , 
and b w i l l  be in the choice s et  unl e s s  aPb .  
Under prof i l e  p l e t  C = Ci l aP . b }  and J/C = Ci l bP . a} .  Then a1 1 
i s  in the  choice s e t  for f ( p ) .  Suppose  J/C e rK for some Kt;: I. Then
the prof ile  q where  J/C = Ci l bP . a ) and the concerne d  s e t  for a ver sus1 
b i s  K has the property that a t f ( q) s ince J/C i s  a w inning
coa l i ti on ,  But the transforma tion p -> q doe s not demote a in a ny
indiv idual ' s  weak ordering s ince i t  doe s not expand the se t Ci l bPi a } ,
Thus ,  J/C e rK violates  the as sumpt ion that f is Ma skin monotoni c ,
Now a s  t h e  se cond part o f  the proof,  i t  i s  ne ce s sary to 
e stabl i sh Lemma 3 when A is a CCE subse t and type I preference s are
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adm i s s ib l e. Thi s part of the proof operates  by present ing prof il e s  
such that J/c e rK contradicts  Ma skin monotoni c i ty .  Suppo se x, y e A .  
Under prof ile  u members  of C have type I pref erence s w i th b l i s s  point 
x, members  of  J/C have type I preference s with bl i s s  po int y, and 
members  of I/J are indi fferent b e tween any two a l ternat ive s in A. 
Under prof i l e  v members  of J/C have type I preferences  w i th b l i s s  
poi nt y ,  members  of K/( J/C) have type I preference s with b l i s s  point 
x ,  and members  of I/K are  indi fferent be tween a ny two a l ternatives in 
A. 
The fol lowing argument s e st abl i sh tha t  x e f ( u ) . For 
a e A/Cx } there are three ca se s: 
( 1 ) l z - y l 
( 2 ) I z - Y I  
C3l I z - y l
I x  - y l  where l ' I i s  Eucl ide an di s tance;
Ix  - y l ;  
I x  - y l .  
I n  case  ( 1 )  c = Ci lxP . z }  and J/c = Ci l zP.x} .  Since c e rJ ' xPz for 1 1 
z e A where case ( 1 )  app l i e s. In case  ( 2 ) , J = Ci l xP . z }  and1 
D Ci l zPix} . Since r1 is  a s impl e game ,  0 
z e A where  case  ( 2 )  appl i e s .  In case (3) , 
i rJ so that  xRz for a l l
C = Ci l xP . z }  and1 
Ci l zPixl. S ince re i s  a simpl e game ,  0 i re so that  xRz for al l
z e A where case  (3) appl i e s ,  Since xRz for z e A in ca se s ( 1 ) , ( 2 )
a n d  (3) and s ince the se c a s e s  e xh aust the po s s ib i l it i e s ,  x e f ( u ) .
Under profile  v ,  K i s  t h e  concerne d  s e t  for x versus y and 
J/C = Ci l yP.x} .  It fol lows that yPx and xi f ( v) , The transformation1 
u -> v doe s  not demote x in any indiv idua l ' s  weak ordering because the
se t of individual s with bl i s s  poi nt y doe s  no t e xpa nd. All other 
individual s , those in I/( J/C) , e i ther have b l i s s  point x or are 
un iver s a l ly indi fferent under each of the prof i l e s ,  For i e I/ CJ/Cl 
it is true that xRiz for a l l  z e A under e i ther prof i l e .  Since the
transf ormation u -> v doe s not demote x in any individua l ' s  weak 
ordering,  Ma skin monotonic i ty requires  that x e f (u)  =)  x e f ( v) . 
Thi s i s  contradicted  by the fact  that  x e f ( u )  and x t f ( v) . 
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Q,E. D. 
Lemma 3 s t a t e s  that i f  a coa l i t i on l os e s  in the s impl e  game 
for any concerne d s e t ,  i t  cannot be  a w inning c oa l i ti on in the s impl e 
game for any other concerne d s e t .  S imil ar rea soning t o  the proof of 
Lemma 3 produce s the next resul t :  if a coa l it i on ne i ther w ins nor 
loses  in  the s impl e game for any conce rne d s e t ,  i t  cannot be  a w inning 
coa l i t i on in the s impl e game for any other conce rne d  s e t .  
Lemma 4 .  If a neutral social  funct ion i s  Ma skin monotonic and for 
some C t; J t; I i t  i s  true that C i rJ and J/C i rJ where rJ i s  the
s impl e g ame for concerne d set  J, then C t rK f or any K � I  where rK i s
the s impl e game f or concerne d s e t  K.  
Proof: Ca l l  the ne utral  soci a l  funct i on f so that  i t s  choice s e t  for 
prof i l e r i s  f ( r) , Let fK be the s impl e game corre sponding t o  f for
concerne d set  K. 
The f irst  part of  thi s  proof e s tabl i shes  Lemma 4 when A is a
f ini t e  a l ternative  set  and indiv idual preference s are weak orderings . 
Two prof il e s ,  p and q ,  of weak orde rings over A w i l l  be used,  and both 
have the prope rty that for c e A/{ a , b ]  a Pic and bPic for all i e I ,
Since r1 i s  a simpl e game ,  0 t r1 • A s  a re sul t ,  a wil l b e  i n  the
choi ce set  unl e s s  bPa, and b wil l be in the choice set unl e s s  aPb .  
Suppose th at C e rK for some K � I when C t rJ and J / c  t rJ
for some J t; I .  Le t pro f i l e  p h ave concerne d s e t  J for a versus b ,
and l e t  profil e q have concerne d s e t  K for a versus b ,  Under both 
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prof i l e s  let C = { i l bPi a ] . Then a e f ( p )  s ince C t  rJ so that  i t  i s
not true tha t  bPa . Al so,  a i f ( q) s ince C e rK ' The transformation p 
-) q doe s not demote a in  any indiv idua l ' s  weak ordering s ince the s et  
c ! i l bP . a ] doe s  not e xpand under the transformation and aP . c  for a l l
1 1 
c e A/[ a , b ]  and for a l l  i e I under both p and q .  Unde r  these  
ci rcum stance s ,  Maskin mono t oni c i ty requires  that  a e f ( p )  => a e f ( q) .  
But a e f ( p )  and a i f ( q) s o  that there i s  a contradict i on ,  
The t a s k  of  the se cond part o f  the proof i s  t o  e st ab l i sh Lemma 
4 when A i s  a CCE sub s e t  and type I preference s are adm i s sibl e ,  Thi s
part  of the proof wi l l pre sent prof il e s  such tha t  the hypo the s i s 
C e rK whil e  C t fJ and J/C i fJ contradicts  Ma skin mono toni c i ty .
Suppo se x, y e A.  Under  prof i l e  u ,  members  of C have  type I 
preferences  with b l i s s  po int y ,  members  of J/C have type I preference s 
w i th b l i s s  po int x ,  and members  o f  I/J are ind ifferent b e tween any two 
a l terna tives in A. Under prof i l e  v membe r s  of C have type I 
prefer ence s w i th b l i s s  po int y, members  of K/C have type I preference s 
w i th b l i s s  po int x, and members  of I/K are indifferent be tween any two 
a l ternatives  in A. 
The fol l ow ing arguments  e stabl i sh that x e f ( u ) . For 
z e A/ [ x ]  there are three case s :  
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( 1 )  l z - y f < I x  - y l where 1 · 1  i s  Eucl idean di stance ;
( 2 )  l z - y l ) I x  - y l l 
( 3 )  l z - y l I x  - y l . 
In c a se ( 1 )  c = { i  I zP . x }  and1 J/C = f i l xP . z } .1 Since C i r1 , xRz for
z e A where case ( 1 )  appl ie s .  I n  e n  se ( 2 ) , J = f i l xP . z }  and1 
� f i l zPix} . Since r1 is a simpl e game,  0 t r1 , and consequently xRz
for z e A where case  ( 2 )  appl i e s ,  In case  ( 3 )  J/C = ( i f xPiz }  and
� = f i l zPix} , S ince rJ/C i s  a s impl e game , 0 t rJ/C and consequent ly
xRz for z e A where e n  se ( 3) app l i e s .  S ince xRz for z e A in en se s 
( 1 ) , ( 2 )  and ( 3 )  a nd s ince these ca se s e xhaust the possibil it i e s ,  
x e f ( u ) . 
Under prof ile  v ,  K i s  the conce rne d s e t  for x versus y and C 
f i lyPix } . Since C e  rK' yPx, and therefore x i  f ( v) . lne
trans formation u -> v doe s not demote x in any individua l ' s  weak 
ordering .  The set  of individual s w i th b l i s s  point y doe s  not  e xpand.  
All other individual s ,  those in  I/C, ei ther have bl i s s  point x or are 
universa l ly indifferent under each of the profil e s ,  Thus , for i e I /c 
i t  i s  true that xR iz for al l z e A under e i ther prof ile  u or prof il e
v .  Since the trans formation u -> v doe s  not demote x in  any
indiv idual ' s  weak orde ri ng ,  Ma skin monotonic i ty requires  that x e f ( u )  
= >  x e f ( v) , Thi s  i s  contradicted b y  the f a c t  that  x e f ( u )  and 
xi f ( v) , 
Q. E. D ,  
Lemma 5 builds  on Lemmas 2 ,  3 and  4 to show that  i f  a neutr al
soc ial  function i s  Ma skin monotoni c ,  it  is  generated  by a direct sum 
of simpl e game s .  By Theorem 1 in  B l au and Brown ( 1 97 8) and by  Theorem 
1 in S trnad ( 19 82 )  neutral  monotonic  social  functions a re 
characterized  by direct sums of  simpl e games .  As a re sul t ,  a Ma skin 
monotonic neutral  social  funct ion i s  a neutral monoton i c  social  
funct ion. 
lemma 5 .  If a neutral soc i a l  function f i s  Ma skin mono tonic ,  then f 
is generated by a direct sum of simpl e games , 
Proof :  Suppo se  that for the ne utral b inary de c i s ion 
K !;;; I ,  rK i s  the s impl e game corre sponding to f when
i s  K. In orde r to show that r = rrK1 I i s  a d irect Ke2 
game s ,  two character i s t i cs must be  e stabl i shed : 
(A)  C e r1 => C e rK where  C !;; K !;; J;
( B) D e r; =) D e r� where J !;; L.
rul e f and for 
the conce rned  s e t  
sum of simpl e 
To prove (A) , a s sume tha t  C i  rK. The n  there are two ca se s :
K/C e rK and K/C i rK. The f irs t  case  i s  rul ed out by Lemma 3 .  The
se cond case  i s  rul ed out by Lemma 4 because if C i rK and K/C i fK,
then C e r1 is imposs ib le  under tha t  l emma if f is Ma skin monotonic .
• 
Now consider propo sit ion ( B) and suppo se tha t  D i rL. Then
there are two c a se s :  ( 1 )  D e rL' ( 2) D i rL and L/D i rL . The f irst
• case  i s  incons i stent with Lemma 3 s ince D e rJ impl i e s  that  D B rL
cannot be true for any L !;; I i f  f is Ma skin monotoni c ,
For the se cond c a se it  i s  ne ce s sary t o  prove the re sul t by 
constructing  prof i l e s  that lead  to a contradiction of Ma s kin 
monotoni city .  Fi r s t ,  cons ider the si tua tion where A is  a f inite  se t 
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and individual  preference s must b e  weak orderings , Le t prof il e s  p and 
q of weak orderings h ave the fol lowing prope r t i e s :  
( 1 ' )  for a l l  c e A/ ! a , b )  aPic and bPi c for a l l  i e I under both
profil e s ;  
( 2  ' )  for a ver sus b the conce rne d s e t  under prof il e p i s  L and 
D = ! i l a Pib ) ;
( 3 , )  for a ver sus b the conce rne d s e t  under prof ile  q i s  J and 
D = [ i  l a P ,  bl.1 
Since 0 i rI' a i s  in  the choice set for e i ther p or q unl e s s  bPa, and 
b is in  the choice s et  for e i ther p or q unl e s s  a Pb ,  Since L/D t rL' 
• 
aRb under pro f i l e  p and a  e f ( p ) . Since D e  r1, bPa under prof ile  q 
and a t  f ( q) ,  The transformation p -> q doe s  not demote a in a ny
indiv idua l ' s  weak ordering because the s e t  of those  who prefer  b to a 
contracts  from L/D to J/D under tha t  transform a ti on ,  Under those 
ci rcumst ances  Maskin monotonicity requires that  a e f ( p ) => a e f ( q) ,
but here a e f ( p )  and a t  f ( q) , 
Now consider  the s i tua tion where A is a CCE subse t  and type I 
preferences are  adm is s ib l e ,  Let x,  y e A. Def ine the prof i l e s  u a nd 
v as fol low s .  Under  profil e u, members  of D have type I preference s 
w i th b l i s s  point x, members  of L/D have type I preference s w i th b l i s s  
point y ,  and members  of  I/L a r e  indi fferent b e tween any two 
a l terna tives in A. Under prof i l e  v, members  of D have type I 
preference s with b l i s s  po int x, members  of J/D have  type I preference s 
w i th bl i s s  po int y ,  and members  of I/J are indi f ferent between a ny two 
a l terna tives i n  A ,  
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The fol lowing argument s e s tabl i sh that  x e f ( u ) . For z e A/ ! x l  
there are three case s :  
o >  I z y ) I x y l where l ' I  i s  Eucl idean distance ; 
( 2 ) l z - y l I x - y l ; 
< 3 l  I z I x 
In case  ( 1 )  D = [ i l xP , z }  and L/D = [ i ) z P . x } ,1 1 
a l l  z e A where case ( 1 )  holds . In case  ( 2 )  
Since L/D i f L' xRz for
L = [ i ) xP . z )  and1 
D [ i l zPixJ . Since rL is a s impl e  game ,  0 t rL. and xRz for al l
z e A where  case  ( 2 )  holds , In c a s e  ( 3 )  D = ( i )xP . zl and1 
( i l zPix ) , S ince f0 i s  a s impl e  game ,  0 t f0, and xRz for al l
z e A where case  ( 3 )  holds . Since xRz for z e A in c a s e s  ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) and 
( 3 )  and s ince these case s exh aus t the po s s ibi l i t i e s ,  x e f ( u ) , 
Under profile  v ,  J i s  the concerned  s e t  for x versus y and 
D = ( i ) xP . y ) ,1 
• Since D e f1, yPx, and there fore x i f ( v) , The 
transformation u -> v doe s not demote x in a ny individua l ' s  weak
ordering .  The set  of individual s  with b l i s s  point  y contracts  from 
L/D to J/D , For a l l  i e I/ ( J/D )  xR . z  for a l l  z e A under prof ile  v .  1 
Since the transformat ion u -> v doe s not demote x in any individua l ' s
weak ordering, Maskin monotonicity requires that x e f ( u )  => x & f ( v ) . 
Thi s i s  contradicted by the fact that x e f ( u )  and x i  f ( v) . 
0, E, D .  
Lemma 5 shows that  Ma skin monotonicity l imits  neutra l  social  
funct ions to  the  class  o f  neutral  monotonic social  functions , The 
fo l lowing l emma e stabl i shes  that Ma skin monotonicity leads to further 
restri ctions . 
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Lemma 6 .  If a ne utral social function i s  Ma skin monotoni c ,  then i t  i s  
a ne , • ral monotonic social  funct ion that i s  s impl e ,  
Proof :  By Lemma 5, a Maskin monotonic neutral soc ial funct ion i s  
generated by a direct  sum of simpl e game s ,  By Theorem 1 in B lau and 
Brown ( 1 97 8) , and Theorem 1 in Strnad ( 1 9 82 ) , f is therefore  a ne utral 
monotonic social funct ion .  
Suppose that r i s  the  direct sum of  s impl e games  that 
generat e s  f ,  Using Lemmas 3 and 4 i t  i s  straightforward to  show that 
f is s impl e if it i s  Maskin monotoni c .  Lemma 3 prov ide s that if f i s  
Maski n monoton i c ,  then for any C c;;;; I i f  there i s  a J c;;;; I such that 
• C e r1 , then C i rK for any K such that C c;;;; K c;;;; I .  J t  fol lows that i f
• C e r11 for some H c;;;; I, then C i rL for any L such that C c;;;; L c;;;; I .
Lemma 4 provide s that if  f i s  Maskin monoton i c ,  then for any C !:; I i f
there i s  a Jc;;;; I such that Ci r1 and J/C i r1 then C i  rK for any K
such that C !:; K t;  I .  It  fol lows that if  C e r11 for  some II !:; I ,  then
there w i l l  be no L !:; I where C c;;;; L, C i rL and L/C i rL.
Col l ecting  these re sul t s ,  if f i s  Maskin monotoni c and for any 
C t; I i f  C e r11 for some II !:; I then
( 1 )  for al l J such that c c;;;; J c;;;; I 
and ( 2 )  for al l K such that C !;; K c;;;; I
and K/C i rK.
• 
c i r1;
i t  i s  never 
From ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  i f  f i s  Maskin monotonic and C e rn
true that C i rK
for some II c;;;; I
then for all J such that C c;;;; J c;;;; I ,  C e r1 • Thus i f  f i s  Maskin
monoton i c ,  C e r11 for some II c;;;; I if and only if C e rJ ' So for any x ,
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y e  A xPy if and only if  C i l xPiy) e r1 • It fol lows that f i s  s impl e .
Q. E . D. 
Given Lemma 6 ,  i t  i s  pos s ib l e  to prove the fol l owing 
characterization theorem, 
Theorem 5 .  A neutral social funct ion i s  Mo skin monotonic if  and only 
if it i s  a neutral monotonic soc ial funct ion that i s  s impl e .  
Proo f :  Maskin monotonic i ty i s  a suff ic ient condit ion for f to b e  a 
neutral monotonic social funct ion that i s  s impl e by Lemma 6 .  
Suppose  f i s  a s impl e neutral monotonic soc ial funct ion , Then 
by Theorem 1 in B lau and Brown ( 1 9 7 8 )  and Theorem 1 in Strnad ( 1 982 ) 
there exi s t s  a unique direct  sum of simpl e game s ,  r. such that f = µr
where µr i s  the aggregation rule generated by r. Le t a, b e A, and
suppo se a e f ( p )  for some prof i l e  p. To compl ete  the proof it i s  
suff ic ient to show that a e f ( q) for any prof i l e  q such that the 
transformati on f rom p to  q doe s not demote a in any individual ' s  weak 
ordering . 
From a e f ( p )  i t  fol l ows that I/f i laRib )  i r1 for al l b e A
with b F a. Otherwise , there would be a s e t  C !:; I such that for some
e e A C = f i l ePia)  e r1 and then ePa so that a i f ( p ) . Suppo se q is a
prof i l e  w i th the prope r ty that the transformation p -) q doe s  not 
demote q in  any indiv idual ' s  weak ordering . It fol lows  that when p 
change s to q ,  f i l bPia) wi l l  not expand for any b e A. Because r1 i s  a
monotonic game ,  D i r1 => E i r1 whenever E c;;;; D. Therefor e ,  there
wil l be  no b e A such that f i l bPia) e r1 under prof ile  q s ince no such
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set i s  in  f1 under prof ile  p. S ince f is a s impl e social  function,  i t  
fo l lows from f i l bPi a }  t f1 under prof i l e  q for a l l  b e  A that there
wil l  be  no c e A such that f i l cPi a }  e f1 for any J <;;;: I under prof i l e  
q,  Thus , under prof i l e  q there w i l l  b e  n o  c e A such that cPa ,  and 
a e f ( q) • 
Q. E.D.  
The fol lowing theorem e stabl i she s  a cond i t i on on d irect  sum s 
of s impl e games equival ent to Ma ski n ' s NYP condi t ion .  
Theorem 6 :  A ne utra l  monotonic social  function  generated by r ,  a 
d irect  sum of simpl e games ,  w i l l  have the property NYP i f  and only i f  
there i s  no J � I  such that r1 i s  an  ul traf i l ter .  
Proof :  ( a )  Nece s s i ty :  I f  there i s  a J � I such that r1 i s  a n  
ul traf il te r ,  then there i s  an  i e J such tha t  ( i }  e 0 rJ ' Since f1 i s  
a f il te r ,  C = 0 r1 e f1 . It  i s  e a sy t o  show that C must be  a
s ingl eton ,  If it  i s  not , then no  s ingl e ton is  i n  f1 and  a l l  
coa l i tions o f  s i z e  11 1 - 1 are in  r1 b y  the ul traf i l ter prope rty tha t  
D t f 1 => J/D e f 1 . Then 0 r1 = 0 s i nce the i ntersect ion of a l l
coa l it i ons of s i z e  I J I - 1 i s  empty .  Thi s  contradi c t s  rJ being a
f il ter .  
Assume there is  a J � I  such tha t  r1 i s  an  ul traf il ter and  l e t  
( i }  b e  the s ingl eton member o f  r1 • Cons ider a prof il e p such that for
a ,  b e A a P . b ,  J/ f i }  = f J l bP . a } and I/J = fk lblka } , Now it w i l l  be1 J 
the c a se th a t  b t f ( p )  but ,  for a l l  j # i, bRj a .  Thi s  contradi c t s
NYP. 
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(b )  Suffic i ency: Suppo se f doe s not s a t i sfy NYP. Then there 
exi st a, b e A such that bPa and aR . b  for al l j e I excep t  po ssibly  
J 
for some i e I .  If aRib'  then bPa when there i s  no t e I such that
bPta .  But s ince f i s  a d irect  sum of s impl e games ,  0 t f1 for any
J � I .  Thus , bPa i s  imposs ible  unl e s s  bPta for at l ea st one t e I ,  
Suppo se then that bPi a .  Le t C ( j f a P . b }  and DJ ( i }  u c.  
Since bPa,  ( i }  e fD . Since ( i }  e f0, if i e E � D then E e fD s i nce
f0 is a monotoni c game .  Furthermore ,  any F <;;;: D such tha t  i t F wil l
• be such tha t  D/F e fD and thus F e fD, It fol lows that ( 1 )
0 r0 = ( i }  e rD and ( 2 )  for a ny G <;;;: D e i ther G e rD or D/G e rD s ince
one of G and D/G must conta i n  i .  By ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) , rD is an  
ul  traf  i1  ter . 
Q. E. D. 
Given The orems  5 and 6, ful ly Nash impl ementable  neutral  
soc i a l  funct i ons and ful ly strong Nash impl ementab l e  neutral  social  
funct i ons can be  parti a l ly characterized .  
Theorem 7 .  A neutral soci al funct ion f wil l be e i ther ful ly  Nash 
implementabl e or ful ly  strong N a sh impl ementabl e only if f is a s impl e 
neutral monotonic  socia l  funct ion ,  
Proof : Theorem 2 in Ma stin (1977 )  and Theorem 1 in Ma skin ( 1979)  show 
that  Ma stin monotonic i ty i s  a ne ce ssary cond i t ion both for ful l Nash 
impl ementa t ion and for ful l strong Nash impl ement a t ion of soc i a l  
choice corre spondence s over finite  al terna tive s e t s .  Nothing in  the 
proof of e i ther re sul t depends on the f ini tene s s  of the a l terna t ive 
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set ,  so  tl1ese re sul t s  a l so hol d for CCE subse t  a l terna tive se t s ,  By  
Theorem 5 ,  a neutra l  social  funct i on that is  Ma  skin monotonic must be  
a s impl e neutral monotonic soc i a l  funct i on,  
Q ,E ,D ,  
Theorem 8 :  I f  a neutral binary de c i si on rul e f i s  a s impl e neutral 
monotoni c  socia l  funct ion generated  by a d irect  sum of s impl e games  r 
and i f  rI i s  not an ul traf i l ter,  the n  f i s  ful ly Nash impl ementabl e ,
Proof : 1 s impl e neutral  monotoni c socia l  funct ion f i s  Maskin 
monotonic by Theorem 5 ,  Let r be the direct  sum of s impl e games  that 
generates  f ,  If rI i s  not an  u l traf il ter,  then  no fJ for J � I  i s  a n
ul traf il ter s ince f i s  s impl e ,  By Theorem 6 ,  f s a t i s f i e s  NVP, 
Theorem 5 in Maskin ( 1 977 )  shows that  Maskin monotonic i ty and NVP a re 
j ointly suf f icient for a social  choice  corre spondence to be ful ly Nash 
implementable  over f inite  a l terna tive  se t s .  Theorem 4 in thi s  ar t i c l e  
shows tha t  Maskin monotoni city and NVP are  j ointly suf fi cient for a 
soc i a l  choice  corre spondence to be ful ly Nash implementabl e over  CCE 
subse t  a l terna tive s e t s . 
O. E .D .  
Theorem 9 .  A neutral monotoni c soci a l  funct ion over a f ini te 
a l t erna tive s et  generated  by a direct  sum of s impl e games  r i s  fully 
s trong Nash impl ementable  only if  for some J � I ,  fJ i s  an
ul traf  il ter . 
Proof :  By Theorem 2 i n  Maskin ( 1 97 9) no soc i a l  choi ce corre spondence 
s a t i sfy ing NVP is ful ly strong Nash impl ementab l e , By Theorem 6 in 
th i s  articl e ,  a neutral monotoni c social  function  f wil l have the 
property NVP if and only if r, the d irect sum of s impl e games  that 
generate s  f ,  conta i ns no s impl e game tha t  is an  ul traf il ter ,  
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Q,E ,D .  
For the  c a se of neutral  social  funct i ons over f ini te 
a l t erna tive s e t s ,  a compl ete  characteri z ation of ful ly strong Nash 
impl ementabl e rul e s  i s  po s s ib le  us ing Theorems 7 and 9 ,  
Theorem 10 . A neutral  social  funct i on f over a f inite  al terna tive se t 
wi l l be ful ly strong Nash impl ementable  i f  and only if f i s  a s impl e 
ne utra l  monotonic  socia l  funct i on where the s e t  of a l l  winning 
coa l i t ions under f is an ul tra f i l ter .  
.f!.Q..Qi: ( a )  Nece s s i ty:  Suppo se  f i s  a neutral social  func t ion tha t  i s
ful l y  s trong Nash impl ementabl e .  By Theorem 7 f must b e  a s impl e 
neutral monotonic social  function ,  If the d irect sum of s impl e games  
that  generate s  f i s  r.  then rl mus t be the se t of a l l  winning
coa l i t i ons under f .  By Theorem 9 ,  there i s  a concerne d  s e t  J � I such 
tha t  rJ is an ul tra f i l ter .  Jt fol l ows that { i }  8 rJ for some i E J .  
Since f i s  s imple ,  { i }  B rI' and rl i s  therefore an ul traf i l ter .
(b )  Suff ic i ency : I f  f i s  a simpl e neutral monotonic  social  
function where the  s e t  of winning coal i t ions under f i s  an  
ultrafil ter,  it  i s  s traightforward to construct a de c i s ion mechanism 
tha t  ful ly impl ements f by strong Nash equil ibr i a ,  S ince f i s  a 
s impl e  neutral monotonic  social  function, it i s  generated by a direct 
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sum of simpl e games  r ,  and rI contains  a l l  coa l it ions that win in a ny 
concerned se t ,  S ince rI i s  a n  ul traf i l ter,  by the argument in the
proof of Theorem 6 there exi st s an individual  such  tha t  ( i }  e rI and
0 fI = ( i } . It fol l ows that for any two x ,  y e  A xPy if and only if
xPiy and xiy if and only  if xI 1y .  ( When xi iy ' then ne i ther
( j  e I l xPj y) nor (k e I l yPkx )  is a winning coal ition s ince rI conta ins
a l l  winn i ng coa l i t ions and 0 fI = ( i ) , )  The choice s e t  therefore
con s i s t s  of a l l  the a l terna tive s at the top of the dictator i ' s  weak 
ordering ,  
Let  the d ec i s ion mechan i sm cons i st of e ach individua l 
spe c i fy ing a sing l e  " f irst  choice" with the soc i a l  choice be ing the 
dictator ' s  spec i f ied f irst  choice . It i s  e a sy to show that the set of 
stron� �ash equil ibri a  for thi s  deci s ion mechan i sm is pre c i se ly the 
choice se t ,  Suppo se the d ic ta tor spe c i f ie s  an a l terna tive x from the 
top of hi s or her weak  ordering as h i s  or her first  choice and 
there fore as  the out come of the deci s ion mechani sm . Then the dictator 
cannot be  part of any group a l l  of who se members  would be be tter off 
by j ointly a l tering their  strate g i e s  s ince the d ic ta tor doe s  not 
prefer any al terna t ive to x .  But no  group wi thout a dictator can 
change the social outcome by changing their strate g i e s ,  In add i tion ,  
if the  dictator did  not  spe c i fy an al ternative  a t  the  top of h i s  or  
her  weak  ordering a s  a strate gy ,  then the  d i c t a tor can do  better  by 
swi tching hi s or her strate gy to such an a l terna t ive . Thus no 
stra te gy vector where the d ic ta tor doe s not spe cify a f irst  choice a t  
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the top o f  hi s o r  her weak ordering can  b e  a strong Na sh equil ibrium ,  
Q, E . D .  
Theorem 7 comb ined w i th Theorem 2 i n  S trnad ( 1 982 ) prov ide a 
l ink be tween those neutral  soc i a l  funct ions that  are cont inuous-valued 
and those tha t are fully Nash impl ementable  or ful ly s trong Nash 
impl ementab l e .  Consider the fol lowing coroll ary : 
Coro llary l ,  A ne utral soc i a l  function f over a CCE subset
a l terna t ive s et  w i l l  be fully Nash  impl ementabl e or  ful ly strong Nash 
impl ementable  only if f i s  cont inuous-valued for all  prof i l e s  of 
cont inuous-value d indiv idual weak orderings , 
Proo f :  By Theorem 7 ,  a neutral soc i a l  funct ion f i s  ful ly Na sh 
impl ementable  or ful ly strong Nash implementable  only if  f is a s impl e 
ne utral monotonic  social  funct ion. By Theorem 2 in Strnad ( 1982 )  a 
neutral monotonic  social  funct ion f wi l l  be cont inuous-valued for a l l  
prof i l e s  of cont inuous-valued individual  weak  orderings i f  and only if  
f i s  s impl e ,  
Q, E .D .  
Fe rej ohn, Gre ther and McKe lvey [ 7 ]  prove some characteri z ation 
resul t s  for Nash implementable  and s trong Nash implementab l e  social  
choice corre spondence s ,  Ana logous re sul ts for ful ly Nash 
impl ementable  and ful ly strong Nash impl ementable  neutral  social  
functions are straightforward corol lari e s  of Theorem 7 .  One Ferej ohn , 
Gre ther and McKel vey re sul t i s  their Theorem 1 .  In the terminology of 
this  art ic l e  tha t  re sul t i s  that when A i s  a f inite  se t ,  I I I  i I A I  and
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I A I  2 3 ,  then a soc i a l  choice corre spondence f with a nonempty choice
se t for all  prof i l e s  o f  weak orderi ngs is ne i ther Nash impl ementab l e  
nor strong Na sh  implementable  if  f i s  minimal ly democrat i c , 2 The
fol lowing coroll ary provide s an ana l og to tha t  resul t for ne utral 
social functions tha t  are ful ly Na sh impl ementab l e  or ful ly strong 
Nash implementabl e . 3
Corol l ary 2 :  When A i s  f in i te and I A I  L I I I , a neutral  social
funct ion tha t  i s  ful ly Na sh impl ementabl e or that i s  ful ly strong Nash 
impl ementable  cannot be m inimal ly democra t i c  and have a nonempty 
cho i ce s et  for a l l  prof i l e s  of weak  ordering s ,  
Proo f :  Let f b e  a ne utral social  function .  By Theorem 7 ,  if  f i s  
fully Nash implement a b l e  o r  ful ly strong Nash implementabl e ,  then i t  
i s  a s impl e neutra l  monotonic social  function .  Suppose  that P i s  the
direct sum of s impl e game s that generates  f,  Since f is s impl e ,  r1
conta ins a l l  the winning  coa l i tions under f ,  
The fol lowing argument demonstrate s that i f  f i s  m inimal ly  
democratic ,  fI cannot  be a pre f il ter ,  Suppose rI i s  a pref i l ter and
i e I is in the col l egium ,  Choose a profi l e  p such that for a l l  
j e !/[ i )  there i s  a n  x e A such that xP . z  for a l l  z e A/[x } , Unde r  p J 
l e t  i have preference s such tha t  for some y e A yPi z for a l l  z e A/[ y}
and xPiz for a l l  z e A/{ x ,  y} , Since f i s  m inimal ly democrat ic ,  f ( p )
= [ x )  i s  requi red,  But s ince i e 0 rI and rI conta ins  a l l  coa l i tions
th at win in any concerne d s e t ,  y e  f ( p ) , 
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If rI is not a pref i l ter ,  then r i s  not a d irect  sum of 
pre f il ter s ,  By Theorem 4 in B l au and Brown (1978 )  f is  not a social  
de c i s ion function when IA I  L I I I  unl e s s  f i s  generated  by a d i rect sum
of prefil ter s ,  As a re sul t ,  profil es  can be constructed such that 
there is a soci a l  cyc l e  over all the a l terna tives in  a finite se t .  To 
see thi s ,  suppo se the al terna t ive se t i s  [x1 , x2 , , , , , xm ) and cons ider
m 
the chain of coa l i tions cl ' ' ' ' ' cm such that n c .i=l 1 
members  of  coa l i tion Ci prefer xi to xi+l ( where xm+l
each Ci is a winning coa l i t ion, there i s  a social  cyc l e ,  x1Px2Px3 , , ,
PxnPx1 , Bl au and Brown ( 1 97 8) s how that there i s  a profi l e  of weak
order i ngs con s i stent with thi s  s i tua t ion, Tha t  the condi tion 
m 
n c .  
i = l  1 
0 for Ci e rI i s  po s s ib l e  fol lows from the fol lowing a rgument ,
Since rI i s  not a pref i l ter ,  there i s  some s e t  S of coal itions in  i t
that h a s  empty inter section ,  Make this  a m inimal ly-sized  set  S '  by 
exc l ud ing the l argest number  of coa l it ions from S such that the 
interse ct ion i s  s t i l l empty , Each coa l i tion in S'  must unique ly 
exc l ude  a t  least one member  of I from the interse c t i on ,  Otherwise 
that coa l i tion would be e xtrane ous , It fol lows that S'  ha s a t  most n 
coa l i tions in  i t  where I I I  = n.  But s ince n � m,  it  i s  po s s ib l e  to
m 
choose m coa l it ions C .  such that 1 n c .  = 0 .  i=l 1 
Now if  rI i s  not  a pre f il ter , for some p e W
I it  wil l be  the
case tha t f ( p )  = 0 .  Tiii s contradi c t s  the requi rement tha t  the cl10 i ce
se t be nonempty for a l l  prof i l e s  in WI ,
Q, E , D, 4 
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The arguments in  the  proof of Corol l ary 2 ind i ca te the value 
of the characteriz ation re sul t in Theorem 7 .  Starting with neutral 
so c i a l  funct ions that  resul t yields  s impl e  neutral monotonic  soc i a l  
fun c t ions . Given s impl e ne utral monotonic soc i a l  functions , a l l  the 
machine ry of B lau and Brown ( 1 97 8) and Strnad ( 1 9 82 )  can be used to 
a s s e s s  whe ther and how impl ementabi l i ty i s  affected by various 
re s trict ions , In particular,  the proof of Corol l ary 2 re st s solely on 
the fact  that when A i s  f inite  and I A I 2 I I I no neutral monotonic 
soc i a l  function can  s imul tane ously be  minimal ly democrat i c  a nd have a 
nonempty choice s et  for a l l  prof i l e s  of weak order ings . No a spe c t  of 
implement a t ion such as  the na ture of the equil ibr i a  sets is  used in 
the proof , 
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1 .  Thi s  def ini ti on i s  t aken  from Kramer ( 1977) , Type I preference s 
have ( hyper ) spheri cal  indi fference curves  wi th a b l i s s  po int in 
the center  of the ( hyper ) sphere . 
2 .  Ferej ohn, Grether and McKe l vey ' s Theorem 1 al so encompa sse s 
implement a t i on by equil ibrium concept s " in b e tween" Nash 
equil ibrium and strong Nash equil ibrium.  In parti cul ar,  they 
de f ine a k-equil  ibrium as one where no coa l i t ion of s i z e  l e s s  than 
or equal  to k can make al l of i t s  members  better off by j ointly 
changing their  strate g i e s ,  Thus ,  Nash equi l ibrium i s  
1-equil ibrium and strong Nash equil ibrium i s  n-equi l ibrium where 
I I I = n, In i t s  ful l genera l i ty Ferej ohn, Grether and McKe l vey ' s  
Theorem 1 a s s ert s  that  no minimally democratic  soc i a l  choi ce 
corre spondence i s  impl ementable  by a s et  of k-equil ibr i a  for 
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It e ( 1 , 2 , . .  . , n ) .
3 .  No more than an ana l og i s  presented here for two r e a sons , F i r s t ,  
Ferej ohn, Gre ther and McKe lvey ' s  Theorem 1 i s  not l imi ted t o  
ne utral soci a l  functions but appl i e s  to the  more general  c l a s s  of 
all soci a l  cho ice corre spondence s .  Second , the characterizat ion 
re sul ts in t h i s  chapter rest  heav ily on the expl oitation of the 
property of Ma sk.in monotonic i ty .  Ferej ohn, Gre ther and McKe lvey 
do not use Ma sk.in monotonic i ty .  They use a form of monotonic i ty 
that focus e s  on equil ibrium se t e l ement s i nstead  of  choi ce se t 
e l ement s .  Thus ,  by the Lemma in  thei r  a r t i c l e  for any 
k e ( 1 ,2 , , , . , n ) if x i s a It-equil ibrium under  one prof i l e  and i f  
the prof ile  i s  changed in  a way tha t  doe s not demote x i n  anyone ' s
weak  ordering ,  then x wil l be a k-equil ibr i um  under the new 
prof il e ,  ( See  note 2 ,  supra ,  for a def ini t ion of It-equil ibrium . ) 
A soc ial  choice corre spondence could  have th i s  monotoni c i ty 
property ( ca l l  it "FGM monoton i c i ty") and y e t  not be Ma skin 
monotonic when implementa t ion rather than ful l impl ementat ion i s  
s tudied ,  Under impl ementat ion the equil ibrium s e t  may not  cont a in  
a l l  choi ce s e t  a l terna t iv e s ,  and conseque nt ly even given FGM 
monotonic i ty there may be a choice s e t  al terna tive y tha t  f al l s  
out o f  the cho ice s et  by a change of prof il e s  that doe s  not demote 
y in any indiv idual 1 s weak  order ing ,  
4 .  �> r the c a se of ful l strong Nash implementa t ion this  proof can be
greatly s impl i f ied  by us ing a re sul t a l ready in the l i teratur e .  
5 4  
Spe c i f ically ,  by Corol l ary 4 . 4 i n  Ferej ohn and Grether ( 1981 ) when 
I A I  L I I I  and a social  choice corre spondence f is ful ly strong
Nash impl ementabl e ,  then the coll ect ion of "preval ent coa l i t ions" 
for f i s  a pref i l ter ,  A coa l ition  is preval ent when the choice 
s e t  cons i s t s  of an al terna t ive  x a l one for a l l  prof i l e s  where a l l  
members  of the coa l it ion prefer  x t o  a l l  other al terna tive s ,  
Ferej ohn and Gre ther ' s  re sul t appl i e s  in  thi s  s i tua tion 
because a neutral soc i al function i s  a soc ial  choi ce 
corre spondence ,  G iven a ne utral  social  funct ion f that is ful ly 
strong Nash impl ementab l e ,  Theorem 7 require s f to be a s impl e 
neutral  monotonic social  funct ion .  Given that f i s  s impl e ,  the 
s e t  of preval ent coa l i t i ons for f is rI where r is the direct  sum
of s impl e games  that genera tes  f ,  Ferej ohn and Grether ' s  re sul t 
indicates  that  rI must be a pre f i l te r .  
De spi te the exi stence o f  that r e sul t ,  th i s  proof goe s on to 
cons ider the c a se where rI is not a pre f il ter .  The purpo se of
such an  approa ch is to make clear  where the r e s tr i c t ion I A I  L I I I
i s  used ,  
5 5  
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ADDENDUM fo1· i.'<clifornia Ins t i tute of Technology Social Science Working 
Paper llo . 500 "Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social 
Func tions " by James F. Strnad II . 
March 1 9 84 
I .  I ntroduc tion 
This Addendum revises and extends some of the resul t s  in the 
paper , Some of the revisions are motivated by an anonymous referee ' s  
comment to me that Theorem 2 in Maskin ( 1 97 9 )  has been shown to be 
false by Moulin and Peleg ( 1 9 82 ) . ( Note : this Addendum includes a 
section of defini tions and a reference section that include any 
defini tions and references not i ncluded in the original paper ) . 
Maski n ' s  Theorem 2 states that no social choice correspondence 
sati sfy i ng NVP is fully s trong Nash implementabl e ,  and Theorems 9 and 
10 in my paper rely on that resul t ,  Moulin and Peleg ( 1 98 2 )  show that 
there i s  a class of social choice correspondences satisfying NVP that 
are fully strong N ash implementabl e .  The resul ts that i ndicate that 
are set out as Theorem 7 and 8 and the Corollary of Theorem 4 in 
chapter VI of Moul in ( 1 981 ) . 
I t  turns out that my Theorems 9 and 10 are s till true . A 
first task in this Addendum is to reprove them using resu l t s  from 
Mouli n  a nd Peleg . 
My Theorems 9 and 10 establish that a neutral social function 
is fully strong Nash implementable i f  and only if the se t of all 
winning coalitions is an ul traf i l ter , i.� . .  if and only if there i s  a 
dicta tor , Having a dictator clearly violates NVP ( "no veto player " ) , 
A n  i nteresting question is how this negative resul t relates to Moulin 
and Peleg ' s  positive resul t .  A second task i n  this Addendum i s  to 
address that question . 
Finally,  a third task is to extend some of the full Nash 
implementation resul ts i n  my paper sligh tly and to compare those 
resul ts to resul ts i n  Moulin ( 1 9 81 )  . Before performing any of the 
three tasks , i t  is necessary to provide some addi tional defini tions . 
II . Defini tions 
Many of the defini tions i n  thi s section are taken almost 
word-for-word from Moulin ( 1 9 81 ) . Chapter VI of Moulin ( 1 9 8 1 )  and 
Moulin and Peleg ( 1 9 82 )  focus on effectivity functions rather than on 
neutral social functions or on direct sums of simple games . Moulin 
( 1 9 81 ) defines an effec tivity func tion for a finite al terna tive se t A 
and a set N of members of society as a binary relation defined on 
coalitions and subse t s  o f  outcomes ( i t  i s  then a subs e t  of 2 N X 2A ) 
denoted eff and satisfying the following proper ties : 
i )  mono tonicity with respect t o  coalitions : 
{T eff B and T c  T ' )  ==} ( T ' eff Bl V T ,
T '  S 2N and V B S 2A ; 
i i )  monotonicity w i t h  respec t  to subsets of outcomes : 
(T eff B and B c B ' )  ==} (T eff B ' )
and V B ,  B '  S 2A ; 
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iii ) boundary condi tions : 
( A )  T eff A V non-empty T ,  and N o  ( �  eff A l ; 
( B) N eff B V non-empty B, and No (N eff � } , 
An effectivity function eff is superaddi t i ve if the following 
condi tion holds : 
( Ti eff Bi ' i = 1 ,  2 and T1 n T2 
V Ti 8 2
N and V Bi 8 2A , 
An SDP effec tivity func tion (or an effectivity func tion wi t h  
SDP )  i s  a n  effectivity function defined as follows : 
T eff B iff
and B = A .
This effectivi ty function is named SDP because , as Moulin ( 19 81 )  puts 
it,  the function i nvol ves "a very .§harp )2is tribution of fower , "  A 
"winning coali tion" in W can limit the choice set to fil!.Y nonempty s e t
o f  alternatives , A l l  other coa l i tions have no power to limi t the
choice set in any way , 
An SDP effectivity function is a collection of monotonic 
game s ,  I' = CI'JJ N where each rJ is a monotonic game , Furthermor e ,J82 
rN = W contains all the winning coalitions , It i s  easy to check that
a monotonic game , viewed as an effectivity function , is superadditive 
if and o nly if i t  i s  proper . A superadditive SDP effectivity function 
is a simple neutral monotonic social function . This follows in a 
3 
s traightforward way from the fact that rN is a simple game and the
fact that for all K !;;; J !;;; N K 8 rJ if and only if K 8 rN '
Moul in ( 1 9 81 ) has a concep t  of neutral i ty for effectivity 
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functions that differs from neutrality as defined in my own paper . To 
dis ti nguish the two conce p t s , Moul i n ' s  concept will be cal led "eff-
neutral i ty . "  An effectivity function eff is eff-neu tral if : 
(T eff B ,  I B I  I B ' l l  � ( T  eff B ' l . 
For I A I = p this amount s  to saying that eff is represented by an 
integer-valued mapping T � e ( T )  in the following way : 
T eff B iff I B I  L e ( T )
where e ( T )  8 ( 1 ,  • •  . , p }  V T !;;; N ,  T F- ¢ .  
Assumption i )  from the definition o f  an effectivity function implies 
that e i s  non-increasing with respec t  to i nclusion . 
Setting v ( T )  = p - e ( T ) , for I A I  = p we obtain a veto
func tion , i . .§.. , a non-decreasing mapping from 2N - � into
( O ,  . . . , p - 1 ) . 
Conversely to any non-decreasing mapping v from 2N - � into
[ 0 , , , , , p - 1) we can associate the effectivity function : 
T eff B iff v ( T )  L I Bc l  = p - I B I  
where Bc i s  the complement of B in A .
The q uant i ty v ( T )  i s  simply the maximum number of al terna tives that 
5 
coalition T can veto . When a veto function is  anonymous , v ( T )  depends 
only on I T I , 
Eff-neutral effectivity functions therefore are veto 
functions . One par ticularly impor tant and useful veto function is the 
proportional veto function . For a coalition T, let I T I  = t ,  Also , 
let I N I  = n .  The veto function 
Vt 1 ,  . . .  , n  v ( t )  = foil - 1 n , p  n 
is the proportional veto function for n and p .
greatest integer strictly less than pi,-- -- n 
Thus , v ( t )  is then , p  
Clearly , v ( t )  i s  roughly proportional to t .  Namely then , p  
inequalities x i fxl < x + 1 imply : 
Vt 1 ,  • • •  , n  pi - l i v  ( t )  n n , p  
t p-. n 
Suppose S is a social choice correspondence and g is  a 
decision mechanism . Call individual i ' s  strategy space Xi ( versus Si
used in my paper ) and call the product space of individual strategy 
n 
spaces X = II X
j 
where n = I N I . Denote by XT the product space ofj=l 
individual strategy spaces for all individuals  in coalition T .  Let 
L ( A )  rather than W stand for the product space of weak orderings for 
individuals in society , and let L ( A ) T be the product space of weak
orderings for individuals in coalition T .  Now denote by a-effs and 
a-eff the following effectivity functions , For all non-empty T 8 2Ng 
and all non-empty B 8 2A :
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3 uT 8 L ( A )  
T c T a-effs B iff Vu 8 L ( A /  : S (uT , u  ) C: B;  Tc Tc 
T a-eff B iff 3 xT 8 XT Vx 8 x n ( xT , x  ) 8 B g Tc Tc Tc 
where S ( u )  is the choice set for S for profile u and n ( x )  is the 
outcome of the decision mechanism g for strategy vector x .  
Intui tively , for a coalition T t o  be "a-effective" for B under g ,  that 
coalition mus t have a message xT that guarantees that the final
outcome belongs to B no matter what message is sent by the 
complementary coalition , Tc .
There are several important traits to consider in the 
characterization of effectivity functions . An effectivity function 
eff on A, N is said to be maximal if it is such that : 
T eff B # No {Tc eff Be l V non-empty T 8 2A
and V non-empty B 8 2N .
When an effectivity function represents a simple game, rJ ' this
property amounts to the requirement that V B !;;;:; J ei ther B 8 rJ or
• 
B 8 rJ . In other words , each coalition either must be a winning
coalition or must be a losing coalition . A simple game with such a 
property will be called a strong simple game . ( When a strong simple 
game is  also a filter , it is  then an ul trafil ter . )  Given A ,  N ,  an 
effectivity function eff and a profile u 8 L ( A ) N the core C (eff, JJ. )  is
the fol lowing , possibly empty ,  subset of A :  
Va 8 A { a  8 C (eff, JJ.) ) # { VT �  N No { T  eff Pr (T ,  a ,  g) } )
where Pr ( T ,  a ,  Q) is the set of all al ter na tives b 8 A such that all
members of T prefer b to a under profile Q. Eff i s  a s table
effec tivi ty function if the associated core i s  non-empty for all 
profiles : 
(eff is stabl e }  # ( V Q 8 L ( A ) N C ( eff,  Q) � �} .
Two kinds of social choice correspondences are of special 
interest . When i ndividual preferences are weak orderings , a social 
choice correspondence S has the property independence of irrelevant 
al ternatives i f  Vx , y 8 A xRiy # xRi ' y  Vi implies that C ( A ,  R )  and
C ( A ,  R ' )  are the same where C ( A ,  R) is the choice set of the social 
choice correspondence under the profile R consi s t i ng of weak ordering 
Ri for each individual i. A social choice correspondence , S, is
c losed i f  the following three condi tions hold : 
( 1 ) S is Maski n mono tonic ; 
( 2 ) a-effs is maximal ; 
( 3 )  V non-empty T � N and V non-empty B � A ,  T a-eff S B if and
only if [ V UT 8 L ( A )  
T , ( B  is on top of uT } � ( S ( uT , u ) !: B} ] Tc 
where S ( u )  is the choice set of S for profile u ,  Tc i s  the complement
of T in N and "B is on top of ur" means that no member of T prefers
any el ement in A / B  to any element in B .  
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III . Resul ts and Discuss ion 
A .  The Moulin-Peleg Resul ts for Full Strong Nash Implementation 
Moulin and Peleg ( 1 9 82 ) consider a social choice 
8 
correspondence consisting of the core correspondence of an effectivity 
function.  
N In other words , Vg 8 L ( A )  S ( g) = C ( eff , Q) so that the
social choice correspondence S maps from L ( A ) N into A and the mapping
cons i s t s  of choosing from A for each Q 8 L ( A ) N the core of the
effectivity function for profile g. Moulin and Peleg then arrive a t
t h e  fol l owing two theorems ( stated as Th eorems 7 and 8 in par t VI of 
Moulin ( 1 981 ) ) :  
Theorem A : If an effectivity function is stable and maximal , then i t s
core correspondence i s  fully s trong N a s h  implementabl e .  
Theorem � :  Suppose a decision mechanism d fully impl ements a social
choice correspondence , S, by s trong Nash equilibria .  Then d and S 
have the same effectivi ty function eff . Fur thermor e ,  this effectivity 
function i s  stable and maximal . 
Theorem A establishes a class of social choice correspondences 
that are ful ly strong Nash implementable . For an example of some 
members in that class consider the Corollary of Theorem 4 in part VI
of Moulin ( 1 981 ) restated here as the fol lowing theorem : 
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Theorem £ :  I f  n and I A I = p are relatively prime , the propor tional
veto function is the unique stable and maximal effectivity function 
that is anonymous and eff-neutral . If n and p are not relatively 
prime , thtre i s  no anonymous and eff-neutral effectivity function that 
i s  stable and maximal . 
Theorems A and C make i t  easy to see that Moulin and Peleg 
( 1 9 82 )  correctly asserts that Theorem 2 in Maskin ( 1 97 9) is wrong , 
That theorem s t a tes that when there are at l east three al terna tives,  
no social choice correspondence sati sfying NVP i s  fully strong N ash 
implementabl e ,  Consider the propor tional veto function when n = 5 and 
p = 3 ,  Since n and p are relatively prime , this effectivity function 
i s  stable and maximal by Theorem C ,  By Theorem A i t s  core
correspondence is fully strong N ash implementabl e .  B y  the defini tion 
of a propor tional veto function, when n = 5 and p = 3 a coalition with 
four members can veto two of the three al terna tives while a single ton 
coalition cannot veto any alternative by i tsel f .  If a group o f  four 
all have the same al ternative at the top of their weak ordering , they 
can use thei r two vetos to assure that that al ternative is the social 
outcome regardless of what the fifth member of society doe s . This 
propor tional veto func tion therefore satisfies NVP . 
B ,  The Implications for my Resul ts 
Theorems 9 and 1 0  in my paper rely on Theorem 2 in Maskin 
( 1 97 9) that Moul in and Peleg have shown to be wrong . It turns out 
that utilizing Theorem B above from Moul in and Peleg ' s  wor k ,  my 
Theorems 9 and 10 can be e stablished without relying o n  Maski n ' s  
erroneous resul t .  
1 0  
T o  see how this c a n  be done , i t  is sufficient t o  trace out t h e  
impl ica tions of the condi tion "stable and maximal " when effectivity 
functions are limited to the class of SDP effectivity functions , By 
Theorem 5 in part VI of Moul in ( 1 981 ) , a stabl e  and maximal 
effectivity function is superadd i tive , But ,  as discussed in par t II 
above , the class of superaddi tive SDP effectivity functions i s  
precisely t h e  class of simple neutral monotonic social f4nc tions , The 
restriction to SDP effectivity functions in the argument here is 
appropriate since Theorem 7 in my paper establ ishes that a necessary 
condi tion for neutral social functions to be e i ther ful ly Nash 
implementable or fully strong N ash implementable is that they be 
simpl e neutral monotonic social functions , 
Nakamura ( 1 97 5 )  shows that for a simple game the corresponding 
effectivi ty function is stable if and only if it is an acycl i c  game , 
i_. Q . , any empty intersection of winning coali tions in t he simpl e game 
has at l east I A I + 1 members , Moulin shows that a s traigh tforward
corollary of that resul t is that an effectivity function represe nting 
a simple game will be stable and maximal only if the simple game is 
dictatorial , i_ , §_ , , an ul trafil ter . See the Corollary of Theorem 6 in 
par t VI of Moulin ( 1 9 81 ) . It fol lows that for a neutral social 
func tion generated by r. a direct sum of si mple games,  to be fully
strong Nash implementable, not only r.mst it be a simple neutral 
monotonic social function but also fN must be an ul trafil ter . If fN 
were no t an ul trafil ter , then none of the simple games in the direct 
sum of simple games f would be dicta torial since fN contains all
coa l i ti ons that win i n  any concerned set . Theorem 9 in my paper can 
be restated as follows : 
A simple neutral monotonic social function over a finite 
alternative set generated by r, a direct sum of simple games , is
fu_; . ,, s trong Nash implementable only if fN is a n  ul trafil ter . 
Theorem 10 worded as in my paper follows directly . 
1 1  
c .  The Relation between my Resul t s  and those of Moul in and Peleg 
1 .  Strong Nash Resul ts 
Theorem 1 0  in my paper requires dic t a torship in order that a 
neutral social function be ful ly s trong Nash implementabl e ,  Y e t  as 
i ndica ted in section A above ,  Moulin and Peleg demonstrate that there 
are social choice corresponde nces that are nondictatorial and fully 
strong Nash implementabl e ,  A n  i nteresting q uestion i s  how these two 
resul t s ,  one nega tive and the other positive,  are related . 
The difference between the results must ari se from the 
different classe s of social choice correspondences under study . 
Moulin and Peleg consider social choice correspondences that are the 
core correspondences of effectivity functions . My paper examines 
social choice correspondences that are the core correspondences of 
neutral social fun c tions , ;h.�.  , a social choice correspondence in my 
paper designates for each profile the set of al ternatives that are 
socially undominat e d  under a particular neutral social function . 
1 2  
The central resul t i n  my paper i s  that l1askin monotonici t y ,  a 
ne cessary condi tion for both ful l s trong Nash implementa tion and full 
Nash implementation, requires that neutral social functions be simple 
neutral mono tonic social functions . The previous section i n  this part 
shows that the same restriction ari ses if the cl ass of effectivity 
functions is l imited to SDP effectivity func tions and the necessry 
condi tion for strong Nash implementa tion that the functions be stable 
and maximal is imposed . But the restriction to simple neutral 
monotonic social functions resul ts i n  the disappearance of the 
possibi l i ty of nondictatorial social choice correspondences that are 
fully strong N ash implementabl e .  I n  other words , requiring a sharp 
enough dis tribu tion of power resul ts in only dictatorial effectivity 
functions being fully s trong Nash implementabl e ,  
Is there any corresponding gain t o  l imiting effectivity 
functions to those with SDP ? One significant gain is bi naryne ss , 
which is impl ied by neutrality . The proper ty of binaryness requires 
that for any x, y @ A i f  a profile changes but the class who prefer x 
to y and the class who prefer y to x r emain unchange d ,  then the 
outcome of the binary social choice be tween x and y remains unchanged . 
It does not matter what other al terna tives are considered under each 
profil e ,  and it does not matter how preferences concerning the other 
al ternatives change between profil es . A t  first glanc e ,  this l ooks 
intui tively like "indepe ndence of irrel evant al terna tives" ( "IIA" for 
shor t ) , The usual formal defini tion of IIA , howeve r ,  is much 
narrower . That defini tion sta tes that for a fixed al terna tive se t the 
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choice set remains the same i f  the relation Ri ( preferred or
indifferent to) remains the same for all individuals i between any two 
al ternatives . This is the defini tion given in section II above and by 
Arrow ( 1 96 3 )  and Sen ( 1 97 0 )  among other s .  Sen ( 1 97 0 )  shows that IIA 
is implied by neutral ity . It is also easy to show that IIA is implied 
by binaryness . 
Because neutral social functions have the property of 
binaryne ss , the core correspondence of these functions will never 
contain al ternatives that are dominated in any binary social 
compari son .  Suppo s e ,  for exampl e ,  that in a binary choice under a 
neutral s0 , 4 al function al terna tive x i s social ly preferred to 
al terna tive y .  If those are the only two al ternatives being 
considered,  then the choice set is (x ) .  Binaryness ensures that no 
matter what other al ternatives are added into the comparison, x always 
will be preferred to y so that y never will be in the choice set .  
This type of property does not apply t o  fully strong Nash 
implementable effectivity func tions without SDP . Consider the 
following resul t .  
Theorem Q: Suppose that eff1 is an eff-neutral fully Nash
implementable effectivity . function for I N I L 3 not satisfying SDP . 
Suppose further that for at least one pair of al ternatives (x , y) in N 
there is a fully Nash implementable effectivi ty function eff 2 for the
binary choice between those al ternatives . Then there is a profile 
such that x is the unique s trong Nash equil ibrium for eff2 while y is
the unique strong Nash equilibrium for eff1 . 
Proo f :  Since eff1 i s  eff-neutral , for each coalition T there is a 
number v ( T )  specifying how many al ternatives that coalition can 
1 4  
unilaterally veto . I . �  . . eff1 i s  a veto function . Eff1 is maximal 
since it is fully strong Nash implementabl e .  A maximal veto function 
satisfies v ( T )  + v ( Tc ) p - 1 where Tc is the complement of T in N 
and p is the number of al terna tives . ( This is a straigh tforward 
conseq uence of the defini tion of maximali ty ) . A veto function with 
SDP satisfies ( v ( T )  = p - 1 and v ( Tc ) = OJ or ( v ( T )  = O and 
v ( Tc ) = p - 1 )  V T c N .  Since eff1 is wi thout SDP , there is a 
coali tion Q such that 1 � v ( Q) � p - 2 and the same cond i tion holds
for v ( Qc ) .  I . � .  both Q and Qc can veto at least one al terna tive . 
Now assume without loss of general ity that under eff 2 Q has 
one veto and Qc has none . Suppose further that N / (x , y) = C z1 , 
. . .  , zm) .
Let members of Q and Qc have the following profile where each
al terna tive is preferred to all al terna tives below i t  on the list . 
all members of Q all members of QC 
zl y 
z2 z3 
z 
m 
x 
1 5  1 6  
Under eff2 , Q will veto y leaving x as the unique equilibrium outcome . 
Under eff1 , y will be the unique outcome . For example,  if members 
Qc veto x and some of the z j but not z1 , members of Q wil l  veto 
the rest of the z js .  I t  is easy to see that all strong N ash 
equilibria resul t in y as the outcome . 
zl 
of 
and 
Q . E . D .  
Theorem D indicates that whenever power i s  divided be tween 
complementary coal i tions , wi th an appropriate profile a binary choice 
will be over turned when more al ternatives are under consideration , 
Thus , the nice implementation proper ties of stable , maximal 
effectivity functions arise only when the agenda ( in the sense of the 
alterna tives under consideration ) is given exogenously . But a n  
exogenous agenda i s  not l ikely in a n y  real world process . Usually , 
the age t._ " will be at least par tially under the control of persons or 
institutions . 
that 
Moulin i s  aware of this problem . In Moulin ( 1 9 81 ) he no tes 
. . .  voti ng by veto methods are highly sensitive to the 
par ticular choice of the candida tes set • • . •  Because A 
[ is ]  exogenously fixed in our analysis this drawback is not 
apparent i n  the subsequent resul ts . 
2 .  Nash Resul ts 
In the proof of Theorem 10 in my paper , I showed that a simpl e 
neutral monotonic social func tion , f, is fully s trong Nash 
implementable if the set of all winning coalitions under f is an 
ul trafi l ter , The approach was to wri te down a decision mechanism that 
fully impl ements such a function by s trong N ash equilibria ,  Each of 
the equilibria are also Nash eq uil ibria ,  and there are no addi tional 
Nash equilibria .  ( I t  i s  trivial to check this by reference to pages 
47-48 of my paper , )  Thus , a simple neutral monotonic social function , 
f, is fully Nash implementable if the se t of all winning coal i tions is 
an ul trafil ter . As a consequence , my Theorem 8 can be broadened to 
read : 
All simple neutral monotonic social func tions are fully Nash 
implementabl e .  
Theorem 1 1  in Moulin ( 1 9 81 )  is as follows : 
Theorem � :  A closed social choice correspondence is fully Nash
impl ementa bl e .  
A n  i nteresting i ssue i s  how this relates to my Theorem 8 .  Consider 
the cl ass of neutral social functions . The first of three condi tions 
required for a social choice correspondence to be closed is that it be 
Maskin monotoni c .  Thi s  i s  a necessary condi tion for ful l Nash 
implementation as shown in Maski n ( 1 977 ) . But Maskin mono toni c i ty 
makes a neutral social func tion i nto a simple neutral mono tonic social 
function , By my Theorem 8 such a function is ful ly Nash 
implementabl e .  Thus , i n  the context o f  neutral social functions , the 
other two condi tions required for a social choice correspondence to be 
closed are extraneous to a showing of ful l Nash implementabil i ty . ( I t  
i s  easy t o  check that the third condi tion is met by any neutral social 
17 
func tion but that the second condi tion is an addi tional constraint on 
the class of simple neutral monotonic social functions . )  
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